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Abstract
Wald’s anytime-valid p-values and Robbins’ confidence sequences enable sequential inference for
composite and nonparametric classes of distributions at arbitrary stopping times, as do more recent
proposals involving Vovk and Shafer’s ‘e-values’ or ‘betting scores’. Examining the literature, one
finds that at the heart of all these (quite different) approaches has been the identification of composite
nonnegative (super-) martingales. Thus, informally, nonnegative supermartingales are known to be
sufficient for valid sequential inference. Our central contribution is to show, in a very concrete
sense, that martingales are also universal—all admissible constructions of (composite) anytime p-
values, confidence sequences, or e-values must necessarily utilize nonnegative martingales (or so-
called max-martingales in the case of p-values). Sufficient conditions for composite admissibility are
also provided. Our proofs utilize a plethora of modern mathematical tools for composite testing
and estimation problems: max-martingales, Snell envelopes, and new Doob-Lévy martingales make
appearances in previously unencountered ways. Informally, if one wishes to perform anytime-valid
sequential inference, then any existing approach can be recovered or dominated using martingales.
We provide several nontrivial examples, with special focus on the nonparametric problem of testing
if a distribution is symmetric, where our techniques render past methods inadmissible.
Keywords: Admissibility; anytime p-value; composite supermartingale; confidence sequence; Doob-Lévy mar-
tingale; e-value; max-martingale; optional stopping; sequential inference; Snell envelope; symmetric distribution;
Ville’s inequality.
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1 Introduction
Our fairly mathematical treatment will be immensely helped by a concrete hypothetical example. Con-
sider a sociology (or your favorite discipline) laboratory that wishes to understand if a particular inter-
vention (‘treatment’) has any positive effect whatsoever on a prespecified outcome of interest. Without
getting too bogged down by the details, suppose the ‘average treatment effect’ of the intervention over
the relevant population is denoted by θ. Suppose they want to test H0 : θ ≤ 0 against H1 : θ > 0, or to
estimate θ using a confidence interval. The lab believes that there is an effect, but has no idea how many
subjects to collect data from: a larger sample size means more power, but also more time and money. So
they conduct their experiment sequentially: subjects enter the study one at a time and are assigned to
treatment or control completely at random; denote the data from subject t as Xt.
After observing Xt, they analyze the data X1, . . . , Xt they have so far, and decide if they wish to
collect more data, or whether what they already have suffices to demonstrate an effect (to themselves,
or to a journal, or to the world). Thus, the lab stops their experiment at a data-dependent stopping
time τ—maybe time ran out, or they used the money up faster than expected; maybe the effect was
sufficiently large, or perhaps they lowered their sights by being satisfied with a smaller effect, or became
more optimistic and kept the experiment running longer in the hope for a narrower confidence interval
around a (hopefully) large effect. In other words, the stopping criterion used may itself have changed over
time with funding coming in or drying up, with initial results being more/less promising than anticipated.
In any case, the experiment was stopped at time τ and not earlier or later, and there could be multiple
data-dependent reasons for stopping at τ that were impossible to anticipate in advance.
Now, on adopting the testing approach, they may hope to construct a p-value pτ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies
for any arbitrary stopping time τ , Pr
H0
(pτ ≤ a) ≤ a, for all a ∈ [0, 1], (1)
which is simply the definition of a p-value at stopping time τ . Unfortunately, naively using a t-test, a
chi-squared test, or permutations, does not yield a p-value with this property. Indeed, these types of
‘standard’ non-sequential p-values only satisfy the weaker property
for any data-independent time t, Pr
H0
(pt ≤ a) ≤ a, for all a ∈ [0, 1].
The most straightforward way to construct ‘anytime p-values’ that satisfy property (1) is to employ
bonafide sequential tests like Wald’s sequential likelihood ratio test [26, 27], but extensions to nonpara-
metric settings have also been explored recently [10, 28]. These are also called sequentially-adjusted
p-values [5], or always-valid p-values [12].
If instead the lab had adopted the confidence interval approach, and specifying an error tolerance
α ∈ [0, 1], they may hope to construct a confidence set (often an interval) Cτ (α) ⊂ R which satisfies
for any arbitrary stopping time τ , Pr(θ ∈ Cτ (α)) ≥ 1− α. (2)
Once more, unfortunately, a naive confidence interval based on the central limit theorem or the bootstrap
does not satisfy the desired property. As before, these ‘standard’ constructions instead satisfy the above
property only at fixed data-independent times t. To satisfy property (2), one could employ ‘confidence se-
quences’ proposed by Robbins and collaborators like Darling, Siegmund, and Lai [3, 19, 15], and regaining
interest in recent years [18, 11]; this is a central topic of this paper and we return to it later.
Recently, another set of highly interrelated ideas has been put forward under a variety of names by
authors such as Shafer, Vovk, Grünwald, and their collaborators: test martingales [21] (since the test
statistics are martingales), e-values or sequential e-values [24, 25] (e for expectation), betting scores [20]
(since they have roots in gambling), or safe e-values [9] (safe under optional stopping). Even though
these concepts often have origins in parametric settings, the ideas have been extended to complicated
nonparametric settings involving composite irregular models [28, 10]. We try to strike a balance of
terminologies: we use the terminology of an ‘e-value’, but denote it by e to reinforce the fact that it is an
e-value. Importantly, our use of the term ‘safe’ does not in any way imply that the other two concepts
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(anytime p-values and confidence sequences) are unsafe; indeed they are also safe against optional stopping
and continuation of experiments.
An ‘e-value’ is a nonnegative real number that satisfies
for any arbitrary stopping time τ , EH0 [eτ ] ≤ 1. (3)
As before, a standard e-value (that is not anytime-valid) exhibits the above property only at fixed times
t, which does not suffice for our sequentially motivated applications.
More generally, each of the above modes of inference are often used to perform sequential testing of
H0, but they are not necessarily exhaustive. We may instead want to directly consider a level-α sequential
test, which maps the data (and α) onto {0, 1}, and stop when the test first outputs one (rejection of the
null). Then, we would hope that a level-α sequential test satisfies
for any arbitrary stopping time τ , Pr
H0
(ψτ = 1) ≤ α. (4)
Once more, standard nonsequential tests only satisfy such a type-I error guarantee at fixed times t.
Instead, anytime-valid p-values, e-values, or confidence sets can each be used to derive a level-α sequential
test.
We will define all of the above concepts more formally in what follows, but the above semi-formal
description suffices for the moment. One common theme amongst all the aforementioned works over
the decades is the repeated appearance of various, often sophisticated, nonnegative supermartingales
as the central object that enables all four types of anytime-valid inference, no matter what name they
go under. In the rest of this paper, we further examine this central role of nonnegative martingales in
constructing p-values, confidence sets, and e-values with the desired robustness to optional stopping (and
continuation) of experiments. Specifically, we show that all admissible constructions of these objects must
employ nonnegative martingales (either explicitly, or implicitly under the hood).
We provide a single example here of (2) for the reader to have a concrete instance in mind. In the
above setup, suppose Xs is i.i.d. N (θ, 1), then it can be shown [11] that
for any stopping time τ , Pr
(
θ ∈
[∑
s≤τ Xs
τ
±
√
(1 + 1/τ) log((τ + 1)/α2)
τ
])
≥ 1− α. (5)
Of course, at any fixed time t, denoting zq is the q-quantile of a standard Gaussian Z, we could have
used a width of
z1−α/2√
t
. To approximate z1−α/2, note that the Gaussian tail inequality yields that for
t ≥ 1, we have Pr(Z > t) ≤ (√2pi)−1/2 exp(−t2/2). Setting the right hand side to α/2, we get that
z1−α/2 ≤
√
log(2/(piα2)), which is known to be reasonably tight for small α. Thus the main difference in
the time-uniform bound is the presence of an additional ≈ √log t factor. The above inequality is proved
by applying Ville’s inequality (see (9a) below) to an exponential Gaussian-mixture martingale. These are
tools we encounter later in this paper so we do not elaborate on them further here.
Admissibility: Naturally, the desire for methods satisfying properties like (1), (2), (3), or (4) comes
with an implicit wish for efficiency. In other words, setting pτ = 1, eτ = 1, ψτ = 0, or Cτ = R (or Cτ = Θ
for a more general parameter space) trivially satisfies those requirements, but is clearly uninformative.
We want pτ to be as small as possible, eτ and ψτ to be as large as possible, and Cτ to be as narrow
as possible, while still being statistically valid measures of uncertainty. We use the term ‘dominates’ to
compare pairs of these objects (in order to avoid using case-by-case adjectives like small/large/narrow)—
so, if p′ ≤ p then p′ dominates p. Similarly, if e′ ≥ e then e′ dominates e, if ψ′ ≥ ψ then ψ′ dominates
ψ, and if C′ ⊆ C then C′ dominates C. In this paper, we use the notion of admissibility to capture this
idea: informally, a p-value (or e-value, test, confidence set) is inadmissible if it is strictly dominated by
another p-value (or e-value, test, confidence set). We define admissibility more formally later on.
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Paper outline: Sections 2 and 3 lay out the formal definitions of several of the basic tools—nonnegative
(super)martingales, max-martingales, Doob’s optional stopping theorem, and Ville’s inequality. Section 4
introduces the four central tools of anytime-valid sequential inference: Wald’s anytime p-values, safe
e-values, sequential tests, and Robbins’ confidence sequences. Section 5 provides two simple examples:
Gaussian and symmetric (super)martingales. Then Section 6 and Section 7 summarize this paper’s
central message about the centrality of nonnegative martingales in constructing the aforementioned tools.
Section 6 formalizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for admissibility in the point null setting; it
uses a Doob-Lévy max-martingale construction to show the necessary conditions for p-values, a Doob-Lev´y
martingale for sequential tests, and uses the Doob decomposition of an appropriate Snell envelope to prove
that admissible e-values must also (explicitly or implicitly) employ nonnegative martingales. Section 7
develops several novel reductions of admissibility in the composite null setting to the point null case,
and presents extensions to estimation (confidence sequences). Section 8 presents deeper investigations on
admissibility, including anti-concentration bounds and the role of randomization. Section 9 utilizes the
learnt lessons to produce admissible tests for symmetry. Appendix A.1 recaps certain technical concepts
like local domination and essential suprema. Appendix B details all proofs that are not in the main
paper. Finally, Appendix C contains examples and counterexamples to support several claims made in
the paper.
2 Wald’s anytime p-values and Robbins’ confidence sequences
Given that naive tests or confidence sets do not suffice for inference in sequential settings (as mentioned
in the introduction), the question is what does?
2.1 A time-uniform equivalence lemma
The following lemma is quite central to the construction and interpretation of p-values, confidence sets,
and sequential tests that are valid at arbitrary stopping times.
Lemma 1 (Equivalence lemma). Let (At)t∈N be an adapted sequence of events in some filtered probability
space and let A∞ := lim supt→∞ At :=
⋂
t∈N
⋃
s≥tAs. The following statements are then equivalent:
(i) Pr(
⋃
t∈NAt) ≤ α.
(ii) sup
T
Pr(AT ) ≤ α, where T ranges over random times, possibly infinite, not necessarily stopping times.
(iii) supτ Pr(Aτ ) ≤ α, where τ ranges over stopping times, possibly infinite.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. If the event At is associated with making an erroneous claim
at time t, we interpret the aforementioned three statements as follows:
(i) The probability of ever making an erroneous claim, from time one to infinity, is at most α.
(ii) The probability of making an erroneous claim at an arbitrary data-dependent time T , perhaps
chosen post-hoc as a past time after an experiment is stopped, is at most α.
(iii) When we stop an experiment at an arbitrary stopping time τ , the probability of making an erroneous
claim at that time is at most α.
Intuitively, it is clear that (i) implies (ii), which in turn implies (iii), but the aforementioned lemma
establishes that all three properties are actually equivalent: if you want one of them, you get all of them for
free. This lemma gives the first hint of the centrality of martingales—the third statement is very directly
about optional stopping, even though this fact is somewhat masked in the first two ways of framing the
desired error control. While (iii) enables inferences at stopping times as initially motivated, property (ii)
allows further introspection at previous times, enabling statistically valid answers to questions like ‘what
was the estimate of the treatment effect at time τ/2?’ (where τ was the stopping time).
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The above lemma first appeared recently in Howard et al. [11]. While Lemma 1 did not motivate its
original definition in 1967, Darling and Robbins [3] first defined a ‘confidence sequence’ for a parameter
θ as an infinite sequence of confidence sets (Ct)t∈N such that
Pr(∃t ∈ N : θ /∈ Ct) ≤ α. (6)
In other words the aforementioned confidence sets satisfy property (i) for At := 1θ/∈Ct .
Since its inception 75 years ago, the field of sequential analysis has devoted much effort to constructing
‘anytime-valid p-values’ for testing, which is a sequence (pt) that satisfies (1), and confidence sequences (6)
for estimation, which also satisfy (2) thanks to Lemma 1. In fact, the simplest constructions for both
can be traced to Wald’s sequential probability ratio test, which we return to later.
Underlying the construction of these objects in a variety of works, one often finds the repeated
use of Ville’s inequality for nonnegative supermartingales (NSMs). We will show that this is not a
coincidence: we prove that NSMs underlie all admissible constructions for performing anytime-valid
sequential inference.
To make these claims more formal, and especially to handle composite hypothesis testing, we need to
clarify what the probability Pr means in the above definitions even further, and we do so next.
2.2 Notation and conventions
Let N represent the natural numbers and N0 = N ∪ {0}. We use (Bt) to denote a sequence (Bt)t∈N or
(Bt)t∈N0 where the indexing of t is either implicitly understood from the context or unimportant, but we
use Bt without the brackets to denote a particular element from the sequence. Thus, for example, Ft will
denote a sigma-field at time t but (Ft) denotes a filtration, which is an increasing sequence of sigma-fields.
Unless otherwise mentioned, F0 = σ(U), where U is a [0, 1]-uniform random variable that is independent
of everything else, signifying an external source of randomness, and Ft := σ(U,X1, . . . , Xt) will denote
the canonical filtration, where Xt is the data observed at time t. We allow Xt to take values in some
general space, which we do not need to specify here, e.g., in Rd, equipped with the Borel sigma algebra.
Earlier, we used Pr to represent the probability taken over all sources of randomness, but in what
follows we will use a more explicit notation: we denote the distribution of an infinite sequence of ob-
servations by P; this means that P is a probability measure on F∞ := σ(U, (Xt)t∈N) = σ(
⋃
t∈N0 Ft).
Expectations with respect to P are denoted EP. A set consisting of distributions over sequences will be
denoted P ; so P = {P} is the singleton case, but more generally there may be uncountably many P ∈ P .
In the case of testing, we denote the null set of distributions by Q ⊂ P .
Next, τ will always denote a stopping time, while t denotes a fixed time. A subscript t for pt, et, ψt,
and Ct means that these objects were constructed using only the data available up to time t. In other
words, pt, et, ψt, and Ct are Ft-measurable, or the sequences (pt), (et), (ψt), and (Ct) are adapted to (Ft).
It is also understood that a p-value pt has range [0, 1], an e-value et has range [0,∞] and a sequential test
ψt has range {0, 1}; the range of the confidence set Ct will be formally specified later.
If P is a probability measure on F∞ and τ is a stopping time, we write Pτ for the restriction of P to
Fτ . This is simply the probability measure on Fτ defined by Pτ (A) = P(A), for A ∈ Fτ . (Think of this
as the ‘coarsening’ of P that only operates on events observable up to time τ .)
We sometimes, but not always, assume that P is ‘locally dominated’ by (i.e., locally absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to) a fixed reference measure R; we review the meaning of this in Appendix A.1. For
example, if the observationsXi have Lebesgue densities under all P ∈ P , one can choose the reference mea-
sure to be the distribution of an i.i.d. sequence of standard Gaussians. Existence of a reference measure is
needed to unambiguously interpret conditional expectations like EP[Y | Ft] under measures different from
P, since a priori, such conditional expectations are only defined up to P-nullsets. For completeness, we
elaborate on this in Appendix A.1, but this issue will not actually be visible in the proofs of our results.
2.3 A composite time-uniform equivalence lemma
One of this paper’s central contributions is to characterize admissibility in composite settings. With that
motivation, we present the following extension of Lemma 1 using the notation introduced above.
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Lemma 2 (Composite equivalence lemma). Let Q be a family of probability measures. Let (At)t∈N
be an adapted sequence of events in some filtered probability space and let A∞ := lim supt→∞At :=⋂
t∈N
⋃
s≥tAs. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) supQ∈Q Q(
⋃
t∈NAt) ≤ α.
(ii) supT supQ∈Q Q(AT ) ≤ α, where T ranges over all random times, possibly infinite.
(iii) supτ supQ∈Q Q(Aτ ) ≤ α, where τ ranges over all stopping times, possibly infinite.
Further, if equality holds for any one, then it holds for the other two.
The proof is exactly the same as in Lemma 1 and is thus omitted. For contrast, we now state a version
with expectations instead of probabilities in which the corresponding statements are not equivalent. Such
a non-equivalence points to forthcoming differences between p-values and e-values. The following result
resembles Lemma 1 but a composite version resembling Lemma 2 can also be easily stated.
Lemma 3 (Non-equivalence lemma). Let (Nt)t∈N0 be an adapted sequence of nonnegative integrable ran-
dom variables in a filtered probability space; let N∞ := lim supt→∞Nt. Consider the following statements:
(i) E[supt∈N0 Nt] ≤ 1.
(ii) E[NT ] ≤ 1 for all random times T , possibly infinite and not necessarily stopping times.
(iii) E[Nτ ] ≤ 1 for all stopping times τ , possibly infinite.
(iv) E[f(supt∈N0 Nt∨1)] ≤ 1 for any increasing f such that
∫∞
1
f(y)
y2 dy = 1; in particular E[supt∈N0
√
Nt] ≤ 2.
Then (i) and (ii) are equivalent. Both (i) and (ii) imply (iii), which in turn implies (iv).
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Contrasting the above lemma with Lemma 1 brings out some
of the differences between p-values and e-values. To dig deeper at the difference, note that one could
have equivalently written Lemma 1 in terms of Bernoulli random variables Bt := 1At , in which case
the formulae above involving Q(. . . ) would be replaced by (i) EQ[supt∈N0 Bt], (ii) EQ[BT ], and (iii) EQ[Bτ ],
respectively. Thus, for these specific nonnegative binary random variables (Bt), the relevant statements
are all equivalent, but more generally they are not. This difference later manifests itself in the inability
to take running suprema for e-values, and overall a rather different underlying structure.
3 Martingales, max-martingales, and Ville’s inequality
A martingale is a stochastic process adapted to an underlying filtration, whose value at any time is
the conditional expectation of its value at any later time. This is however not the only possible notion
of martingale; another interesting notion is obtained by replacing conditional expectations by so-called
conditional suprema, leading to max-martingales. Both notions play an important role in this paper. In
particular, max-martingales turn out to be particularly suitable for dealing with p-values. We briefly
review the definitions and basic properties of martingales and max-martingales.
3.1 Martingales (based on conditional expectation)
Given a filtration (Ft) and a measure P on F∞, a process (Mt)t∈N0 is called a martingale (with respect
to (Ft)) if Mt is Ft-measurable, P-integrable, and
EP[Mt|Fs] =Ms for any t and s ≤ t.
(Sub- and supermartingales are defined by relaxing the martingale property and allowing for inequality, ≥
resp., ≤.) Since we had earlier mentioned that F0 includes an initial source of independent randomness,
M0 is itself allowed to be random. Naturally, we have EP[Mt] = EP[M0]. Often, in this paper, (Mt) will
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be nonnegative and the latter quantity equals one and so when we say ‘a nonnegative martingale with
initial value one’, we implicitly mean with initial expected value one.
Given an F∞-measurable integrable random variable Y , the process Mt := EP[Y |Ft] is known as the
Doob (or Doob–Lévy) martingale associated with Y . The fact that this is a martingale follows from the
tower rule of the conditional expectation: EP[Mt|Fs] = EP[EP[Y |Ft] |Fs] =Ms if s ≤ t.
We now generalize these definitions to hold for an entire set of measures. Given a set P of measures
on F∞, a process (Mt)t∈N0 is called a nonnegative P-supermartingale (P-NSM) (with respect to (Ft)) if
Mt is nonnegative, Ft-measurable, and
EP[Mt|Fs] ≤Ms for all t ∈ N, s ≤ t and every P ∈ P . (7)
If (7) holds with equality, (Mt) is called a nonnegative P-martingale (P-NM). If P = {P} is a singleton,
we write ‘P-NSM’ instead of ‘{P}-NSM’. This notational choice is also applied to other objects. We refer
to a P-NM (or NSM) as a ‘composite’ NM (or NSM), while a P-NM is called a ‘pointwise’ NM (or NSM).
Doob’s optional stopping theorem [6] extends the (sub-/super-) martingale property from deterministic
times to stopping times. In general, only bounded stopping times are allowed in the optional stopping
theorem; however, the nonnegativity of an NSM relieves us of this restriction. In particular, if (Nt) is
(upper bounded by) a P-NSM starting in N0, the optional stopping theorem implies that
EP[Nτ ] ≤ EP[N0] for all stopping times τ , potentially infinite, and every P ∈ P . (8)
In fact, if (Mt) is a P-NSM, then we additionally have EP[Mτ |Fρ] ≤Mρ for all stopping times ρ and τ such
that ρ ≤ τ , P-almost surely, for each P ∈ P . Further, by Doob’s supermartingale convergence theorem,
we know that if (Mt) is a P-NSM with initial expected value one, then its limit M∞ := limt→∞Mt exists
P-almost surely and EP[M∞] ∈ [0, 1], for each P ∈ P .
Stemming from his 1939 PhD thesis [22], Ville’s inequality is a time-uniform generalization of Markov’s
inequality for nonnegative random variables; for our purposes, the relevant version states that if (Mt)
is (upper-bounded by) a P-NSM with initial expected value one, then the following three equivalent
statements hold:
P
(
∃t ∈ N :Mt ≥ 1
α
)
≤ α for every P ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1]; (9a)
⇐⇒ sup
P∈P
P
(
sup
t∈N
Mt ≥ 1
α
)
≤ α for every α ∈ [0, 1]; (9b)
⇐⇒ sup
P∈P,τ≥0
P
(
Mτ ≥ 1
α
)
≤ α for every α ∈ [0, 1]. (9c)
Note that (9b) and (9c) usually (and, in particular, for singletons P = {P}) only hold with inequality
but can hold with equality for larger nontrivial nonparametric classes P , as we shall encounter later in
this paper. We also remark that a conditional version of Ville’s inequality is also true, though we do not
utilize it much in this paper. Specifically, if (Mt) is a P-NSM, then
sup
P∈P
P
(
∃t ≥ s :Mt ≥ Ms
α
∣∣∣∣Fs) ≤ α for every α ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
The relationship between likelihood ratios and nonnegative martingales. The simplest NM
(beyond the constant process Mt = 1) that arises rather naturally is the likelihood ratio; indeed this is
at the heart of Wald’s sequential likelihood ratio test [26, 27]. To be specific, when testing H0 : Xs ∼ Q
versus H0 : Xs ∼ P , define the likelihood ratio Mt :=
∏
s≤t
dP
dQ (Xs), assuming that the Radon-Nikodym
derivative dP/dQ exists. If P,Q have densities p, q with respect to a common measure then each term
in the product is just p(Xs)/q(Xs). Let Q
∞ now denote the distribution under which the sequence is
i.i.d., each element distributed according to Q. Wald effectively proved that (Mt) is a Q
∞-NM and a test
that rejects if Mt ≥ 1/α controls the Type-I error at level α due to Ville’s inequality (Wald proved the
result from scratch, but the language of martingales and Ville’s thesis was known to Wald [2]). It is also
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apparent that every nonnegative martingale is a product of nonnegative random variables with conditional
mean one, meaning that if (Mt) is a Q-NM, then Mt =
∏
s≤t Ys, where (Yt) is adapted to (Ft) and
EQ[Yt|Ft−1] = 1 for every Q ∈ Q; to see this, simply define the multiplicative increment as Yt :=Mt/Mt−1
with 0/0 := 1. At first sight, despite having a product form, it may appear like nonnegative martingales
are strict generalizations of likelihood ratio processes. However, in fact, a converse statement is also true:
not only is every likelihood ratio a martingale (under the null), but every martingale is also implicitly a
likelihood ratio; this was discussed by Shafer et al. [21] for point nulls, and we generalize it below to the
composite case, borrowing the terminology of ‘implied alternative’ from Shafer [20].
To make the following result precise we assume that the sequence of observations (U, (Xt)t∈N) is a
process on the space Ω = RN of real-valued sequences, and we let (Ft) be the canonical filtration.
Proposition 4. Consider any composite null set Q of probability measures on F∞, and let P consist
of all probability measures P that are locally absolutely continuous with respect to some Q ∈ Q. (Thus in
particular, Q ⊂ P.) If (Mt) is a Q-NM starting at one, then for every Q ∈ Q there exists some ‘implied
alternative’ distribution P ∈ P (depending on Q) that is locally dominated by Q, such that Mt = dPt/dQt.
In other words, a composite nonnegative martingale is a ‘composite’ likelihood ratio (meaning, it takes
the form of a likelihood ratio under every element of the null).
We recognize that the above statement may be known to different researchers in some form, but it does
provide useful intuition and we have not seen it stated in the generality above. The proof is in Section B.
The informal takeaway message is that nonnegative martingales are implicitly likelihood ratios, but the
former are typically easier to identify (or construct) in composite null settings.
3.2 Max-martingales (based on conditional supremum)
Max-martingales are defined by replacing the conditional expectation by the conditional supremum, so
we start by reviewing this notion; more information can be found in Barron et al. [1] and Larsson [16];
see also Appendix A.2. For a given probability measure P, random variable Y , and sub-σ-algebra G, the
G-conditional supremum is defined as the smallest G-measurable almost sure upper bound on Y :∨
P
[Y | G] := ess inf{Z : Z is G-measurable and Z ≥ Y , P-a.s.}.
Note that
∨
P
[Y | G] ≥ Y by construction, and is the smallest G-measurable random variable with that
property. (Here and in the rest of this subsection, equalities are understood in the P-almost sure sense.)
The conditional supremum can be viewed as a nonlinear analog of the conditional expectation, and has
similar properties. In particular, one has a ‘tower property’ which states that for nested sub-σ-algebras
G ⊂ H, one has ∨
P
[∨
P
[Y | H]
∣∣∣G] = ∨P[Y | G].
Given a filtration (Ft), a process (Yt) is called a P-max-martingale, or P-MM for short, if
Ys =
∨
P
[Yt | Fs], s ≤ t. (11)
Any max-martingale (Yt) is almost surely decreasing, which ensures that the limit limt→∞ Yt exists in
[−∞,∞]. We call a max-martingale closed if Yt =
∨
P
[lims→∞ Ys | Ft] for all t ∈ N0.
As earlier, given a set P of measures on F∞, a process (Yt) is called a (closed) P-max-martingale
(P-MM) if (Yt) is a (closed) P-MM for each P ∈ P .
One can also introduce notions of sub- and supermartingales using the conditional supremum, although
we will not use these here. Moreover, one can analogously define conditional infimum martingales using∧
instead of
∨
, and all properties stated above and below also hold analogously.
In further analogy with (standard) martingales, max-martingales satisfy an optional stopping theorem
[16, Lemma 2.10]. Specifically, consider the process Yt :=
∨
P
[Y | Ft] for an F∞-measurable Y . Thanks
to the tower property, (Yt) is then a max-martingale; we call such a construction a Doob-Lévy MM. We
then have
Yτ =
∨
P
[Y | Fτ ] and Yρ =
∨
P
[Yτ | Fρ]
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for all finite stopping times ρ and τ such that ρ ≤ τ .
The connection between P-MMs and P-NMs goes beyond mere analogies. If (Mt) is a P-NM, the
following statement easily follows from [16, Proposition 4.1]:
1 ∧ inf
s≤t
1
Ms
=
∨
P
[
1 ∧ inf
s∈N0
1
Ms
∣∣∣Ft], t ∈ N0. (12)
A word of warning: although the conditional supremum and conditional expectation are in some ways
similar, they sometimes behave very differently. In particular, the conditional supremum only depends
on the underlying measure P through its zero measure sets. Computing the conditional supremum under
a different measure P′ thus gives the same result whenever the two measures are mutually absolutely
continuous. This is in stark contrast to the behavior of the conditional expectation. (On the other hand,
if P and P′ are mutually singular, as is often the case in our infinite-horizon situations, then one can make
no general statements about the relation between the corresponding conditional suprema.)
Although any nonnegative max-martingale (Yt) is almost surely decreasing, which ensures that the
limit limt→∞ Yt exists, it is possible that Yt and
∨
P
[lims→∞ Ys | Ft] are not necessarily the same, i.e., that
(Yt) is not closed. Indeed, we have the following non-uniqueness property. If (Yt) is a max-martingale
then we usually can find another max-martingale (Y ′t ) with Y
′
t > Yt for each t ∈ N, but (Y ′t ) and (Yt)
have the same limit, almost surely. For example, assume (Zt) is i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2), independent of
(Yt), and adapted to (Ft). Define Y ′t = Yt +
∏
s≤t(Zs ∨ 1/2). Then (Y ′t ) is also a max-martingale, with
Y ′t ≥ Yt + 2−t > Yt for all t ∈ N, but converging almost surely to the same limit as Y ′t as t→∞.
A similar phenomenon also holds true for martingales: if (Mt) is an NM thenM
′
t =Mt+
∏
s≤t(Zs+1/2)
is another NM with M ′t ≥Mt + (1/2)t > Mt for all t ∈ N, but limt→∞M ′t = limt→∞Mt. Hence also for
nonnegative martingales, we often do not have that Mt and E[lims→∞Ms|Ft] are the same.
We conclude this subsection with an interesting example.
Example 5. Let V denote a uniformly distributed random variable and assume that (Xt) is, conditionally
on V , i.i.d. Bernoulli(V ). Then V = limt→∞
∑
s≤tXs/t (the limit frequency of ones), hence V is F∞-
measurable. Moreover, Yt :=
∨
P
[V | Ft] yields a max-martingale. It is now relatively easy to check that
Yt = 1 for each t ∈ N0. This yields an instance where limt→∞ Yt 6= V , but (Yt) is nonetheless a closed
max-martingale since Yt = 1 =
∨
P
[1 | Ft].
4 Tools for anytime sequential inference and their admissibility
We formally introduce the four instruments for anytime-valid sequential inference that play central roles
in our paper. We present a rather natural definition of admissibility for each of the instruments below,
but recognize that other alternatives may be suitable depending on the context.
4.1 Q-valid p-values, Q-safe e-values, and (Q, α)-sequential tests
Let the (unknown) distribution of the observed data sequence be denoted P. Suppose we wish to test the
null H0 : P ∈ Q for some Q ⊂ P , against H1 : P ∈ P (or against H1 : P ∈ P\Q). A sequence (pt) is called
an anytime valid p-value for H0 if it satisfies
Q(pτ ≤ α) ≤ α for arbitrary stopping times τ , every Q ∈ Q, and α ∈ [0, 1]. (13)
Above, we have implicitly defined and used
p∞ := lim inf
t→∞ pt.
For succinctness, we say (pt) is Q-valid. By Lemma 2, the above condition is equivalent to requiring that
Q(∃t ∈ N : pt ≤ α) ≤ α for every Q ∈ Q and α ∈ [0, 1].
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Note that (pt) is Q-valid if and only if the running infimum (infs≤t ps) is Q-valid, so it helps to think of
(pt) as a nonincreasing sequence; in this case, we have p∞ = limt→∞ pt (the limit exists and equals the
lim inf used earlier). When we refer only to the validity of the single random variable p∞, and not the
sequence (pt), we say p∞ is ‘statically’ Q-valid, meaning that its distribution is stochastically larger than
uniform under any Q ∈ Q. The connection to Ville’s inequality (9a), and thus to martingales, should
be apparent. However, p-values do not have to satisfy the conditional property (10), allowing for the
construction of nontrivial p-values that are not simply inverses of the running supremum of a martingale.
Similarly, a sequence (et) is called an anytime valid e-value for H0—or, in short, (et) is Q-safe—if
EQ[eτ ] ≤ 1 for arbitrary stopping times τ , and every Q ∈ Q. (14)
Analogous to the p-value case above, we have implicitly defined and used
e∞ := lim sup
t→∞
et.
It is worth noting that already in the case of a singleton Q := {Q}, if one additionally desired a conditional
safety property to hold for (et), namely that EQ[eτ |Fs] ≤ es∧τ for arbitrary times s and stopping times τ ,
then (et) must necessarily be a Q-NSM; indeed by taking τ = t for t ≥ s, we recover the definition of a
Q-NSM. In fact, if one would like such a property to hold for every Q in a composite Q, such a requirement
can only be satisfied by a Q-NSM. Despite the fact that we will not require this conditional property,
we will see that (composite) Q-NMs or (pointwise) Q-NMs play a central, universal role in constructing
e-values that may not themselves be martingales.
A p-value or e-value does not directly yield a decision rule for when to reject the null hypothesis; they
are real-valued measures of evidence, and need to be coupled with a decision rule in order to yield a test.
A binary sequence (ψt) is called a (Q, α)-sequential test for H0—or, in short, (ψt) is a (Q, α)-ST—if
EQ[ψτ ] = Q(ψτ = 1) ≤ α for arbitrary stopping times τ , and every Q ∈ Q. (15)
As with p-values, we think of (ψt) as nondecreasing, and have implicitly defined and used ψ∞ :=
limt→∞ ψt.
Admissibility: We follow the standard convention of using the term ‘admissible’ as a shorthand for
‘not inadmissible’, so we only define inadmissibility below.
We say that (pt) is inadmissible if there exists (p
′
t) that is Q-valid, and is always at least as good
but sometimes strictly better; more formally, Q(p′t ≤ pt) = 1 for all t ∈ N0 and all Q ∈ Q, and that
Q(p′t < pt) > 0 for some t ∈ N0, and some Q ∈ Q. We say that (et) is inadmissible if there exists (e′t)
that is Q-safe, such that Q(e′t ≥ et) = 1 for all t ∈ N0 and all Q ∈ Q, and also Q(e′t > et) > 0 for some
t ∈ N0, and some Q ∈ Q. Finally, (ψt) is inadmissible if there exists a (Q, α)-sequential test (ψ′t), such
that Q(ψ′t ≥ ψt) = 1 for all t ∈ N0 and all Q ∈ Q, and Q(ψ′t > ψt) > 0 for some t ∈ N0, and some Q ∈ Q.
Remark 6. We could have equivalently formulated admissibility in terms of Q(e′τ > eτ ) > 0 for some
stopping time τ etc.; this is in fact identical to the current definition, because for any discrete-time
random sequences (Wt) and (W ′t ), the statement ‘Q(W ′t = Wt) = 1 for all t’ is equivalent to ‘Q(W ′t =
Wt for all t) = 1’, meaning that pointwise equality at fixed times yields simultaneous equality (including
stopping times). In case it is useful to the reader, another restatement of inadmissibility is the following:
inf
Q∈Q
Q(∀t ∈ N0 : p′t ≤ pt) = 1 and sup
Q∈Q
Q(∃t ∈ N0 : p′t < pt) > 0.
The above definition of admissibility does not specify any alternative. What allows us to do so is that
the admissibility conditions are stated ‘almost surely’. To elaborate, assume there was an alternative, say
P∗ such that there existed some time t and an event A ∈ Ft with P∗(A) > 0 but Q(A) = 0 for all Q ∈ Q.
In this case, on the event A we would always set pt = 0, et = ∞, and ψt = 1. We could always do so
because no Q ∈ Q ‘is aware of’ the event A, hence modifying a p-value on A would not change any of
its Q-distributional properties (like validity). For this reason, and to avoid any notational complication
arising, from now on we always assume the following:
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If there exists some t ∈ N, some A ∈ Ft, and some P∗ ∈ P with P∗(A) > 0 then there exists
also some Q ∈ Q with Q(A) > 0.
This is a very mild assumption! It is, for example, satisfied if there exists some Q∗ ∈ Q such that every
P ∈ P is locally absolutely continuous with respect to Q∗ (see Appendix A.1 for a review). This previous
condition is satisfied, for example, if all measures in P are locally equivalent. In interesting situations
a locally dominating measure Q∗ may not actually exist—for example when testing for symmetry, as we
encounter in this paper—but our standing assumption above is still true. Specifically, the aforementioned
assumption also holds if each P ∈ P is locally absolutely continuous with respect to some specific Q ∈ Q
(potentially different for each P)—this is often easier to check, and indeed holds in the symmetric example.
Note that validity is subset-proof, meaning that validity for Q implies validity for Q′ ⊂ Q; however,
admissibility is neither subset-proof nor superset-proof. It is posssible that (pt) may be admissible for
H0 : Q ∈ Q, but not for H0 : Q ∈ Q′ for some Q′ ⊂ Q or Q′ ⊃ Q; indeed, it may not even be valid in the
latter case. Thus, to avoid confusions, we should say (pt) is Q-admissible, but we sometimes drop the
additional prefix if it can be inferred from the context. (The same logic applies for (et) and (ψt).)
A family of sequential tests {(ψt(α))}α∈[0,1] is said to be ‘nested in α’, if ψt(α′) ≥ ψt(α) for any t and
α′ ≥ α. This ensures that it is easier to reject the null with a larger Type-I error budget.
We conclude this subsection with the following observation.
Proposition 7. Assume that Q is locally dominated. Then any p-value for Q, e-value for Q, or (Q, α)-
sequential test can be dominated by an admissible p-value, e-value, or sequential test, respectively.
It is proven in Appendix B using transfinite induction. Next, we switch from testing to estimation.
4.2 (φ,P, α)-confidence sequences
Let φ be a map from P to an arbitrary set Z. For every every γ ∈ Z, define
Pγ := {P ∈ P : φ(P) = γ},
and note that {Pγ}γ∈Z is a partition of P . Of special interest is the i.i.d. case where P = µ∞. As
examples, consider φ(P) = φmed(µ) denoting the median of µ, or φ(P) = φmean(µ) denoting the mean of
µ. Another case of interest is where each P ∈ P can be represented as Pθ for some unique θ ∈ Θ (the
‘parametric’ setting) and then φ(Pθ) = θ. One may also care about fully nonparametric functionals, for
example φcdf , which maps µ to its cumulative distribution function (or φpdf if µ has a Lebesgue density).
We then define a (1−α)-confidence sequence for a functional φ as an adapted sequence of confidence
sets (Ct) such that
sup
P∈P
P (∃t ∈ N : φ(P) /∈ Ct) ≤ α. (16)
This error condition can be phrased equivalently as a coverage criterion: P (∀t ∈ N0 : φ(P) ∈ Ct) ≥ 1− α,
for every P ∈ P . Above, we have suppressed the dependence of Ct on α for notational succinctness.
Moreover, we emphasize that the outer probability P matches with the inner functional φ(P), as it should,
Indeed, the coverage probability for φ(P) should hold given that the data used to construct Ct was drawn
according to this P. We then say that (Ct) is a (φ,P , α)-CS. If required, we define C∞ := lim inft→∞ Ct.
Note that even though we defined (Q, α)-sequential tests without explicit reference to any functional
φ, one could associate Q to the subset of P in which φ takes on certain values. In other words, we can
absorb the role of any such φ into the definition of Q to reduce notational overhead.
We say (Ct) is inadmissible if there exists (C
′
t) that is a (φ,P , α)-CS such that P(C′t ⊆ Ct) = 1 for all
t and all P ∈ P , and P(C′t ( Ct) > 0 for some t and some P ∈ P .
Finally, let us mention a minor technical point. A CS (Ct) is by definition an adapted sequence of
random sets. In this paper, we take ‘adapted’ to simply mean that all events of the form {z ∈ Ct} belong
to Ft. This is sufficient for our needs, and lets us avoid dealing with σ-algebras on spaces of sets.
Last, as for sequential tests, a family of CSs {(Ct(a))}a∈[0,1] is said to be nested in a if Ct(α′) ⊆ Ct(α)
for any t and α′ ≥ α.
Remark 8. An analogue of Proposition 7 also holds for (φ,P , α)-confidence sequences, where P is locally
dominated. This will later follow from Theorem 27.
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4.3 Reductions between the four instruments
We now demonstrate how to transform one tool for sequential inference into another; some of these are
well-known or ‘obvious’ but some are new, especially in the composite setting. These transformations are
usually not lossless or bidirectional, meaning that something may be lost in going from one to another
and back again. All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
We start with the most straightforward direction: forming (Q, α)-sequential tests from the other three.
Proposition 9. One can construct (Q, α)-sequential tests in the following ways:
(1) If (pt) is Q-valid, then {(1pt≤α)}α∈[0,1] is a nested family of (Q, α)-STs.
(2) If (et) is Q-safe, then {(1et≥1/α)}α∈[0,1] is a nested family of (Q, α)-STs.
(3) If (Ct) is a (φ,P , α)-CS, then (1φ(Q)∩Ct=∅) is a (Q, α)-ST.
Next, we show how to form a composite anytime p-value from the other three.
Proposition 10. One can construct p-values for Q in the following ways:
(1) If (et) is Q-safe, then (1/et) is Q-valid.
(2) If {(ψt(α))}α∈[0,1] is a nested family of Q-STs, then (inf{α : ψt(α) = 1}) is Q-valid.
(3) If {(Ct(α))}α∈[0,1] is a nested family of (φ,P)-CSs, then (inf{α : φ(Q) ∩ Ct(α) = ∅}) is Q-valid.
A confidence sequence can be formed by inverting families of tests, as follows.
Proposition 11. Recall that Pγ := {P ∈ P : φ(P) = γ}. If (ψγt ) is a (Pγ , α)-sequential test for each
γ ∈ Z then {γ ∈ Z : ψγt = 0} is a (φ,P , α)-confidence sequence. To convert a family of p-values or
e-values into confidence sequences, we can first convert them to sequential tests using Proposition 9 and
then invert those tests as done in the first part of this proposition.
Finally, we can form composite e-values by calibrating p-values, following Shafer et al. [21].
Proposition 12. One can construct e-values for Q as follows: If (pt) is Q-valid, then 1/(2√pt) is Q-
safe. In fact, (f(pt)) is Q-safe for any nonincreasing ‘calibration’ function f : [0, 1] → [0,∞) such that∫ 1
0 f(u)du = 1. To convert a nested family of sequential tests or confidence sequences into e-values, we
can first convert them to p-values using Proposition 10 and then apply the aforementioned calibration.
4.4 Some basic closure properties
At several points in this paper, we will see that convexity of the class of distributions plays a central role,
the first hint of which is provided below.
Proposition 13. Let conv(Q) denote the convex hull of Q. Then the following statements hold.
(1) An e-value for Q is also automatically an e-value for conv(Q). Such closure under the convex hull
also holds for p-values and sequential tests.
(2) An admissible e-value for Q is also automatically an admissible e-value for conv(Q). Such closure
under the convex hull also holds for p-values and sequential tests.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Example 40 in Appendix C shows that the statement of
Proposition 13 does not extend to confidence sequences.
Remark 14. Note that stability with respect to taking a running extremum does not hold for e-values,
but does hold for the other three. To elaborate, if (pt) is Q-valid, then so is (mins≤t ps); if (Ct) is a
(φ,P , α)-CS, then so is (⋂s≤t Cs); if (ψt) is (Q, α)-ST, then so is (maxs≤t ψs). However, a running
maximum does not usually preserve safety for e-values! Moreover, if (et) is P-safe and (ft) is Q-safe,
then min(et, ft) is conv(P ∪ Q)-safe, while (et + ft)/2 is conv(P ∩ Q)-safe. Similarly, if (pt) is P-valid
and (qt) is Q-valid, then max(pt, qt) is conv(P ∪Q)-valid, while 2min(pt, qt) is conv(P ∩Q)-valid. Last,
if (Ct) is a (φ,P , α)-CS and (Dt) is a (φ,Q, α)-CS, then Ct ∪Dt is a (φ,P ∪ Q, α)-CS, while Ct ∩Dt is
a (φ,P ∩ Q, 2α)-CS.
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5 Two instructive examples of exponential (super)martingales
We now illustrate the above concepts with two examples of composite martingales: the Gaussian NM
and the symmetric NSM, the former being a simple parametric example, and the latter being a sophisti-
cated nonparametric example (we use the term sophisticated because it includes atomic and nonatomic
distributions, and there is no underlying reference measure).
5.1 A Gaussian nonnegative martingale
If (Xt) is a sequence of i.i.d. standard Gaussians, then it is well known that exp(
∑
s≤tXs − t/2) is a
nonnegative martingale. This is one of the simplest nontrivial pointwise NMs that one can construct.
Below, we elaborate on how to construct a simple composite NM in the Gaussian case. We generalize the
Gaussian case to an arbitrary fixed mean m and a variance process, where each σ2t is revealed to us on
demand. Technically, we suppose the process (Xt) consists of two components, Xt = (Yt, σ
2
t+1), and let
σ21 be a constant. Note that (σ
2
t ) is a predictable sequence. We now let Gm denote the set of distributions
such that the outcome Yt at time t is conditionally Gaussian with deterministic mean m and predictable
variance σ2t , that is,
Gm := {P : Yt | Ft−1 ∼ N (m,σ2t ) for all t ∈ N}.
Since the distribution generating the predictable variances is left unspecified, Gm is a highly composite
set of measures. Next, define the process (Gmt ) by
Gmt := exp
∑
s≤t
(Ys −m)− 1
2
∑
s≤t
σ2s
 . (17)
It is easy to check that (Gmt ) is a Gm-NM for eachm ∈ R, specifically by evaluating the moment generating
function of Xt. As a direct consequence of Ville’s inequality, a (1−α)-CS (Cmeant ) for an unknown mean
is given by
Cmeant :=
{
m ∈ R : Gmt <
1
α
}
.
Formally, (Cmeant ) is a (φ
mean,
⋃
m∈R Gm, α)-CS for the mean, where we define the mean functional
φmean(P) = m for every P ∈ Gm.
Remark 15. The confidence sequence (Cmeant ) derived above does not yield interval (5) in the introduction.
That CS is obtained by noting that (Gmt (λ)), given by
Gmt (λ) := exp
λ∑
s≤t
(Ys −m)− λ
2
2
∑
s≤t
σ2s
 ,
is a Gm-NM for every λ ∈ R. Fubini’s theorem then implies that (∫ Gµt (λ)dΦ(λ)) is also a Gm-NM for
any distribution function Φ. Choosing Φ as a standard Gaussian for example, yields the normal mixture
martingale (dating back at least to Darling and Robbins [3]). Applying Ville’s inequality then yields (5).
5.2 A nonnegative supermartingale under symmetry
We now move to a nonparametric example that first appears in de la Peña [4] but the core idea can be
traced back to Efron [7], who was interested in the robustness of the t-test to heavy tailed (but symmetric)
distributions; further, it has recently been extended to the matrix setting by Howard et al. [10]. This
example is particularly interesting because of three reasons: (a) it deals with a nonparametric class
of distributions that does not have a common dominating measure (it includes atomic and non-atomic
measures), (b) there exists a rather elegant well-known ‘nonparametric’ NSM, meaning that one single
process is a composite NSM, (c) the visual form of the NSM below is reminiscent of the aforementioned
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Gaussian example, making it intuitively appealing. Unfortunately, we will later demonstrate that this
construction is suboptimal, and leads to inadmissible sequential inference.
Consider the convex set of distributions indexed by m ∈ R, where each increment is conditionally
symmetric around m, i.e.,
Sm := {P : (Xt −m) ∼ −(Xt −m) | Ft−1}. (18)
Consider then the following family of processes (Smt ), indexed by m ∈ R:
Smt := exp
∑
s≤t
(Xs −m)− 1
2
∑
s≤t
(Xs −m)2
 . (19)
It is known [4] that (Smt ) is an Sm-NSM for each fixed m ∈ R; the proof stems from the observation that
cosh(z) ≤ exp(z2/2), and thus for a single symmetric random variable Z, we have
E[eZ−Z
2/2] = E[e−Z−Z
2/2] = E
[
eZ−Z
2/2 + e−Z−Z
2/2
2
]
= E[e−Z
2/2 cosh(Z)] ≤ 1.
Note that the symmetric distribution could be different at each time point (e.g., Gaussian with mean m
at time one, (δm−|X1|+ δm+|X1|)/2 at time two, etc., where δz denotes the Dirac measure at some z ∈ R).
The process (Smt ) is visually quite similar to the Gaussian process (G
m
t ) from the previous subsection.
The relaxation from using the true variance in (Gmt ) to using an empirical variance in (S
m
t ), allows the
NM property to transform to an NSM property for a much larger class of heavy-tailed distributions
(such as t and Cauchy distributions). Even when applied to Gaussians, one no longer needs to know the
variance.
One can check that the sets
Ccentert :=
{
m ∈ R : Smt <
1
α
}
together form a (φcenter,
⋃
m∈R Sm, α)-CS for the functional φcenter, which maps symmetric distributions
to their center of symmetry. Said differently, if P ∈ Sm then P(∃t ∈ N : m /∈ Ccentert ) ≤ α.
Above, we have described only the confidence sequences, but one could equally well have defined
e-values and anytime p-values. For example, to test the null H0 : P ∈ S0, one can use the fact that (S0t )
is an NSM under the null, and thus (S0t ) is an e-value for S0, and (infs≤t 1/S0s ) is a p-value for S0. Of
course, all of these in turn define (S0, α)-sequential tests.
We return to these and other examples later in the paper.
6 Admissible inference for point nulls via martingales
We begin our examination of admissibility via the lens of testing (p-values, e-values and sequential tests)
and leave the results on estimation (confidence sequences) for the Section 7.4.
Theorem 16 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for pointwise admissibility). Consider a point null Q =
{Q}. The following statements describe necessary and sufficient conditions for pointwise admissibility:
(1) If (pt) is admissible, then it is a closed Q-MM with F (inft∈N0 pt) = inft∈N0 pt, where F is the
distribution function of inft∈N0 pt. In the other direction, if (pt) is a closed Q-MM and inft∈N pt is
Q-uniformly distributed, then it is admissible.
(2) (et) is admissible if and only if it is a Q-NM with EQ[e0] = 1.
(3) (ψt) is an admissible (Q, α)-sequential test if and only if ψt := 1sups≤tMs≥1/α, where (Mt) is a
Q-NM with no overshoot at 1/α and M∞ ∈ {0, 1/α}.
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The theorem is proven later in this section, with one subsection per statement.
Unfortunately, a version of the first statement above that is phrased as follows—‘if (pt) is admis-
sible then pt = infs≤t 1/Ms for all t ∈ N0, where (Mt) is a Q-NM’—is incorrect. Below is a simple
counterexample.
Example 17. Let p0 = U , and p0 = p1 = p2 = p3 = . . . . Then (pt) is admissible since it cannot be
improved without violating uniformity. However, since the inverse of a uniform random variable is not
integrable, we cannot find a NM (Mt) that yields (pt); indeed, no nonnegative integrable random variable
M0 can yield p0 = 1/M0.
The above example further demonstrates that max-martingales, not the ‘usual’ martingales, are the
right mathematical construct to deal with p-values. We remark that if we are allowed to construct
continuous-time processes, then one can work with usual martingales, see Shafer et al. [21, Theorem 2].
However, we do obtain the following corollary of Theorem 16(1).
Corollary 18. Let (Mt) denote a Q–martingale and let F denote the distribution of 1∧ inft∈N0 1/Mt. If
F is atomless, then pt := F (1 ∧ infs≤t 1/Ms) is an admissible p-value.
Proof. We will make use of the fact that the conditional supremum commutes with continuous nonde-
creasing functions:
∨
[f(Y ) | G] = f(∨[Y | G]) for every continuous nondecreasing function f ; we will
use this with f = F . Combining this with the max-martingale property of the reciprocal of the running
supremum of an NM (see (12)) we get,
pt = F
(
1 ∧ inf
s≤t
1
Ms
)
= F
(∨
Q
[
1 ∧ inf
s∈N0
1
Ms
∣∣∣Ft]) = ∨Q[F(1 ∧ infs∈N0 1Ms
)∣∣∣Ft] = ∨Q[ infs∈N0 ps
∣∣∣Ft].
The last equality follows because infs∈N0 ps = F (infs∈N0 1/Ms), which is uniformly distributed since F is
atomless. We are now in a position to apply Theorem 16(1) to conclude that (pt) is admissible.
Let us now provide an example of a closed Q-MM that satisfies F (inft∈N0 pt) = inft∈N0 pt in the
notation of Theorem 16(1), but is not admissible.
Example 19 (The gap between sufficient and admissible conditions in Theorem 16(1)). This example
shows that simply using 1 ∧ infs≤t 1/Ms for a Q-NM (Mt) does not typically yield an admissible p-value.
It also provides an example for the gap between the sufficient and admissible conditions in Theorem 16(1).
Define the martingale (Mt) by Mt := 21U≤1/2 for all t ∈ N0. Let now F denote the distribution function
of 1∧ inft∈N0 1/Mt = 1∧ 1/M0. Then F−1(1∧ infs≤t 1/Ms) = 1∧ infs≤t 1/Ms is an inadmissible p-value.
To see this, define a p-value (pt) by pt = U for all t ∈ N0. Then (pt) strictly dominates 1 ∧ infs≤t 1/Ms
because
U ≤ 1
2
1U≤1/2 + 1U>1/2 = 1 ∧ 1
M0
.
6.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for p-values (proof)
Proof of Theorem 16(1). We start with the necessary conditions for pointwise admissibility of a p-value.
To this end, let (pt) be a Q-admissible p-value, which must necessarily be nonincreasing by Remark 14.
First define
p¯ := inf
t∈N0
pt = lim
t→∞ pt,
and let F be the distribution function of p¯. Since (pt) is valid, p¯ is stochastically larger than uniform and
so F (x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, 1]. For later use, let us observe that F is right-continuous, hence
lim
t→∞F (pt) = F (p¯). (20)
We now define
p′t :=
∨
Q
[F (p¯)| Ft] .
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Since F is a nondecreasing function, we have F (p¯) ≤ F (pt) for all t ∈ N0. By definition of conditional
supremum, p′t is the smallest Ft-measurable random variable with this property; therefore, p′t ≤ F (pt)
for all t ∈ N0. Since we also have F (x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, 1] we get p′t ≤ pt for all t ∈ N0. But (pt) is
admissible by assumption, so we must in fact have the equality p′t = pt for all t ∈ N0.
We have now argued F (p¯) ≤ p′t = pt ≤ F (pt). Taking now limits in t and recalling (20), we get
F (p¯) ≤ p¯ ≤ limt→∞ F (pt) = F (p¯), thus allowing us to conclude that F (p¯) = p¯ and that (pt) is closed.
This yields the necessary conditions of the theorem.
Let us now discuss the sufficient conditions for pointwise admissibility of a p-value. To this end, let (pt)
be a closed MM such that inft∈N pt is uniformly distributed. It is then clear that (pt) is valid. Consider
now an arbitrary p-value (p′t) with p′t ≤ pt for all t ∈ N0. We must argue that we have equality. We
clearly have inft∈N0 p′t ≤ inft∈N0 pt. The validity of (p′t) implies moreover that inft∈N0 p′t stochastically
dominates a uniform. This now directly yields that we have indeed inft∈N0 p′t = inft∈N0 pt =: p¯, which is
uniform. By definition of max-martingales, pt is the smallest Ft-measurable upper bound on p¯; since p′t
is another such bound, we must have p′t ≥ pt for all t ∈ N0. This proves that (pt) is admissible.
6.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for e-values (proof)
Proof of Theorem 16(2). Again, let us start with the necessary conditions for pointwise admissibility of
an e-value. To this end, let us fix an admissible (et). Next, let us define the ‘Snell envelope’ of (et) as the
process (Lt) given by
Lt := ess sup
τ≥t
EQ[eτ | Ft],
where τ ranges over all finite stopping times.
First, observe that EQ[L0] ≤ 1 because (et) is Q-safe and EQ[e0] ≤ 1. It is self-evident that (Lt) inherits
the nonnegativity property directly from (et). Moreover, it is clear that Lt ≥ et since τ = t is a valid
stopping time, for all t ∈ N0. Next, we claim that (Lt) is a supermartingale. This is a well-known result,
but for the convenience of the reader we include the short proof. This uses properties of the essential
supremum reviewed in Appendix A.2, in particular Proposition 37.
For each fixed t ∈ N0, Lt is the essential supremum of the family consisting of all EQ[Mτ |Ft] where
τ ≥ t is a finite stopping time. This family is closed under maxima. To see this, let τ and τ ′ be given,
define A = {EQ[eτ |Ft] > EQ[eτ ′ | Ft]}, and set τ ′′ = τ1A + τ ′1Ac . Since A lies in Ft and τ, τ ′ ≥ t, we have
that τ ′′ is a stopping time and we obtain
EQ[eτ ′′ | Ft] = 1AEQ[eτ | Ft] + 1AcEQ[eτ ′ | Ft] = max {EQ [eτ | Ft] , EQ [eτ ′ | Ft]} .
This demonstrates closure under maxima. Consequently we can apply Proposition 37 to obtain finite
stopping times {τn}n∈N with τn ≥ t such that EQ[eτn |Ft] ↑ Lt almost surely. Therefore, by the conditional
version of the monotone convergence theorem, the tower rule, and the definition of Lt−1, we get
EQ[Lt | Ft−1] = EQ
[
lim
n→∞ EQ[eτn | Ft]
∣∣∣Ft−1] = lim
n→∞ EQ[EQ[eτn | Ft] | Ft−1] = limn→∞ EQ[eτn | Ft−1] ≤ Lt−1.
This shows that (Lt) is a supermartingale.
Since we have established that the Snell envelope (Lt) is a supermartingale we can write down its Doob
decomposition as Lt =Mt−At for a unique (nonnegative) integrable martingale (Mt) withM0 = L0, and
a unique nondecreasing predictable process (At) with A0 = 0. The optional stopping theorem applied to
the martingale (Mt) implies that it is an e-value and moreover, Mt ≥ Lt ≥ et for all t ∈ N0. Since (et)
was assumed admissible we get et = Mt for all t ∈ N0. Finally, we can assume that EQ[M0] = 1, else we
can replace (Mt) by (Mt + 1− EQ[M0]), which is again an e-value.
Let us now discuss the sufficient conditions for pointwise admissibility of a NM (et) with EQ[e0] = 1.
First of all, the optional stopping theorem yields that (et) is an e-value. Consider now some e-value (e
′
t)
for Q with e′t ≥ et. Since 1 = EQ[et] ≤ EQ[e′t] ≤ 1, we then have et = e′t for each t ∈ N0, yielding the
admissibility of (et), hence the assertion.
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6.3 Necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential tests (proof)
Proof of Theorem 16(3). Let us start with the necessary conditions for pointwise admissibility of a se-
quential test. Recall that by assumption, (ψt) satisfies
α¯ := Q(∃t ∈ N0 : ψt = 1) ≤ α.
Define now
ψ′t := 1U≤α−α¯ + ψt1U>α−α¯, t ∈ N0.
Note that ψ′t ≥ ψt for all t ∈ N0 and (ψ′t) is again a sequential test. If α¯ < α then indeed (ψ′t) strictly
dominates (ψt), in contradiction to the admissibilty of (ψt). Hence we may assume that α¯ = α.
Define now the Doob-Lévy martingale (Mt) by
Mt :=
Q(∃s ∈ N0 : ψs = 1 | Ft)
Q(∃s ∈ N0 : ψs = 1) =
Q(∃s ∈ N0 : ψs = 1 | Ft)
α
.
Note that EQ[M0] = 1 and if there exists a time τ at which ψτ = 1, then Mt = 1/α for any t ≥ τ . So,
M∞ ∈ {0, 1/α}. Define next ψ˜t := 1Mt≥1/α. By Ville’s inequality, (ψ˜t) is a sequential test that dominates
(ψt). Since the latter was assumed admissible, we have established ψt = ψ˜t for all t ∈ N0.
Consider now a NM (Mt) with no overshoot at 1/α andM∞ ∈ {0, 1/α} and define ψt := 1sups≤tMs≥1/α.
By Ville’s inequality, (ψt) is a sequential test. Consider next some sequential test (ψ
′
t) with ψ
′
t ≥ ψt and
fix some t∗ ∈ N0. Since EQ[ψ∞] = α we know that ψ′t∗ = 1 only on the event {ψ∞ = 1} = {τ < ∞},
where τ := inf{t ∈ N0 : Mt ≥ 1/α}. Hence, ψ′t∗ = 1 implies that Mt ≥ 1/α; otherwise the martingale
property of (Mt) would be contradicted. Thus (ψt) is indeed Q-admissible, concluding the proof of the
statement.
7 Reducing admissible composite inference to the pointwise case
To build intuition towards composite admissibility, we begin with a basic question on validity: is there a
systematic way to construct tools for valid (potentially inadmissible) inference in composite settings?
7.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for valid (composite) inference
The following observations are straightforward and arguably well-known in some form or another, but
are nevertheless useful to spell out formally in order to lay the path for the admissibility results.
Proposition 20 (Pointwise-to-composite validity). The following statements lay out necessary and suf-
ficient conditions that connect validity in the ‘pointwise’ setting to the ‘composite’ setting.
(1) (pt) is Q-valid if and only if pt ≥ pQt , Q-a.s., for all t and Q ∈ Q, where (pQt ) is some p-value for Q.
(2) (et) is Q-safe if and only if et ≤ eQt , Q-a.s., for all t and Q ∈ Q, where (eQt ) is some e-value for Q.
(3) (ψt) is a (Q, α)-ST if and only if ψt ≤ ψQt , Q-a.s., for all t and Q ∈ Q, where (ψQt ) is some (Q, α)-ST.
Proof. We only prove (1), the other two assertions are argued analogously. Suppose we are given that
(pt) is Q-valid. Then, by definition, pt is Q-valid for every Q ∈ Q; so choosing (pQt ) := (pt) itself, we have
proved the ‘only if’ direction. For the other direction, suppose for every Q ∈ Q we are given a p-value
(pQt ) for Q, and that (pt) satisfies pt ≥ pQt , Q-almost surely, for all t. Let Q∗ ∈ Q be some true (arbitrary)
data-generating distribution. We must argue that (pt) is Q
∗-valid. Indeed, for any α ∈ [0, 1], we have
Q
∗(∃t ∈ N : pt ≤ α) ≤ Q∗
(
∃t ∈ N : pQ∗t ≤ α
)
≤ α,
where the first inequality follows because pt ≥ pQ
∗
t , and the second inequality follows because (p
Q
∗
t ) is
Q∗-valid by assumption. This concludes the proof.
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The proposition provides a generic reduction from the composite setting to the pointwise setting for
performing valid inference, but we can deduce a similar result for admissible inference, presented later.
While Proposition 20 forms a useful building block, it makes no mention of martingales. Nevertheless, we
now have the appropriate context in place to summarize some of our central results. Below, we use the
notions of essential supremum and essential infimum, which we review in Appendix A.2, and note that
we will need the additional restriction that P is locally dominated in order for these essential extrema to
be well defined.
Corollary 21 (Pointwise supermartingales are sufficient for composite validity). Let Q ⊂ P be the null set
and assume that P is locally dominated. Then the following statements demonstrate how supermartingales
suffice for sequential inference.
(1) If pt = ess supQ∈Q infs≤t 1/N Qs , where (N
Q
t ) is upper bounded by a Q-NSM, then (pt) is Q-valid.
(2) If et = ess infQ∈QN Qt , where (N
Q
t ) is upper bounded by a Q-NSM, then (et) is Q-safe.
(3) If ψt = ess inf
Q∈Q
sup
s≤t
1NQs≥1/α, where (N
Q
t ) is upper bounded by a Q-NSM, then (ψt) is a (Q, α)-ST.
Above, all Q-NSMs start with initial expected value (at most) one, and (N Qt ) is assumed nonnegative.
This corollary follows directly from Proposition 20 and so its proof is omitted; see also Remark 14.
7.2 Necessary conditions for admissible (composite) inference
Not all constructions based on martingales are admissible. We next provide an analog to Proposition 20,
now for admissibility. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Proposition 22 (Admissible composite tests must aggregate admissible pointwise tests). Let Q be locally
dominated. The following statements show how composite admissible instruments must aggregate (some)
pointwise admissible instruments.
(1) If (pt) is Q-admissible, then pt = ess supQ∈Q pQt for all t, where (pQt ) is Q-admissible.
(2) If (et) is Q-admissible, then et = ess infQ∈Q eQt for all t, where (eQt ) is Q-admissible.
(3) If (ψt) is Q-admissible, then ψt = ess infQ∈Q ψQt for all t, where (ψQt ) is Q-admissible.
The following corollary describes the restrictions that every admissible construction necessarily satis-
fies.
Corollary 23 (Pointwise martingales are necessary for composite admissibility). Let Q be locally domi-
nated. Then the following statements demonstrate how martingales underpin all admissible constructions.
(1) If (pt) is Q-admissible, then (pt) is nonincreasing and pt = ess supQ∈Q pQt for all t, where (pQt ) is a
closed Q-MM.
(2) If (et) is Q-admissible, then et = ess infQ∈QM Qt for all t, where (M Qt ) is a Q-NM with EQ[M Q0 ] = 1.
(3) If (ψt) is Q-admissible, then ψt = ess infQ∈Q sups≤t 1MQs≥1/α, where (M Qt ) is a Q-NM with EQ[M Q0 ] =
1, M Q∞ ∈ {0, 1/α} and (M Qt ) has no overshoot at level 1/α.
The aforementioned three statements are a direct consequence of Proposition 22 and Theorem 16.
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7.3 Sufficient conditions for admissible (composite) inference
The next proposition argues that it suffices to consider only a subset of Q when constructing Q-admissible
p-values, e-values, or sequential tests. Note that we do not require Q to be locally dominated below.
Proposition 24 (Pointwise-to-composite admissibility). Assume there exists a ‘reference family’ (Qi)i∈I ⊂
Q such that for each t and A ∈ Ft,
if there exists Q ∈ Q with Q(A) > 0, then there exists i ∈ I with Qi(A) > 0.
Then we have the following.
(1) If (pt) is Q-valid and (pt) is Qi-admissible for each i ∈ I, then (pt) is Q-admissible.
(2) If (et) is Q-safe and (et) is Qi-admissible for each i ∈ I, then (et) is Q-admissible.
(3) If (ψt) is a (Q, α)-ST and (ψt) is Qi-admissible for each i ∈ I, then (ψt) is Q-admissible.
Proof. Let us only argue here the case of e-values. The other cases follow in exactly the same manner.
Assume that there exists an e-value (e′t) for Q such that Q(e′t ≥ et) = 1 for all t ∈ N0 and all Q ∈ Q, and
that Q∗(e′t > et) > 0 for some t ∈ N0, and some Q∗ ∈ Q. By assumption, there exists some i ∈ I such that
Qi(e
′
t > et) > 0. Since (et) is assumed to be Qi-admissible, we get a contradiction.
Of course, two special cases are found at the extremes: when the reference family is a singleton, it
means there is a common reference measure R, and when the reference family is Q itself, the proposition
is vacuous. The proposition is particularly useful in the first case; then to get an admissible e-value, for
example, it suffices to construct a Q-NSM (Mt) that is also a Q∗-NM, thanks to Proposition 24(2) and
Theorem 16(2). The following example demonstrates one such setting.
Example 25. Recalling notation from Section 5.1, let µm ∈ Gm denote the measure under which (Xt)
is i.i.d. Gaussian with unit variance and mean m, and consider Q := {µm : m ≤ 0}. Then Gt :=
exp(
∑
s≤tXs − t/2) is not a Q-NM—it is a µ0-NM when Xt is standard Gaussian, but is a µm-NSM
for m < 0. Nevertheless, (Gt) is a Q-admissible e-value. The reason is that (Gt), being a µ0-NM, is
immediately µ0-admissible, and the singleton reference family {µ0} satisfies the local absolute continuity
condition required to invoke Proposition 24(2).
Corollary 26 (Composite martingales are sufficient for composite admissibility). Consider a general
composite family Q.
(1) (pt) is Q-admissible if one of the following two conditions holds:
(a) (pt) is a closed Q-MM and inft∈N pt is Q-uniformly distributed for every Q ∈ Q.
(b) pt = F (1 ∧ infs≤t 1/Ms) where (Mt) is a Q-NM and 1 ∧ infs∈N0 1/Ms has the same atomless
distribution function F for every Q ∈ Q.
(2) If (et) is a Q-NM with EQ[e0] = 1 for all Q ∈ Q, then it is Q-admissible.
(3) (ψt) is Q-admissible if ψt = sups≤t 1Ms≥1/α, where (Mt) is a Q-NM with M0 = 1, M∞ ∈ {0, 1/α},
Q-almost-surely, for every Q ∈ Q, and no overshoot at 1/α.
This corollary is again a direct consequence of Proposition 24, Theorem 16, and Corollary 18. As
an immediate consequence of Corollary 26(2), recall the Gaussian example in Section 5.1, and consider
testing if the underlying mean is zero. Since (G0t ) is a G0-NM, it is also G0-safe, and hence a G0-admissible
e-value when testing against, for example, P = ⋃m∈R Gm. However, 1/ sups≤tG0s is not a G0-admissible
p-value; see Section 8.3 for a discussion on the role of randomization in enabling admissibility.
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7.4 Necessary and sufficient conditions for confidence sequences
Proposition 11 already shows us that we can construct a CS by inverting a family of tests. We now show
that their admissibility is also tightly linked to those of the underlying sequential tests.
Theorem 27. Recall that Pγ := {P ∈ P : φ(P) = γ}. If (ψγt ) is an admissible (Pγ , α)-sequential test
for each γ ∈ Z then {γ ∈ Z : ψγt = 0} is an admissible (φ,P , α)-confidence sequence. Similarly, if (Ct)
is an admissible (φ,P , α)-confidence sequence, then ψγt := 1γ/∈Ct yields an admissible (Pγ , α)-sequential
test for each γ ∈ Z, so that Ct =
⋃
γ∈Z{γ ∈ Z : ψγt = 0}. (In fact, if (Ct) is P-admissible, then
Ct =
⋃
P∈P{φ(P) : ψPt = 0} for all t, where (ψPt ) is P-admissible.) As a result, we can infer the following:
(1) If (N Pt ) is upper bounded by a P-NSM, then Ct =
⋃
P∈P{φ(P) : sups≤tN Ps < 1/α}, is a (φ,P , α)-CS.
(2) If (Mγt ) is a Pγ-NM with Mγ∞ ∈ {0,∞}, P-almost surely, for every P ∈ Pγ, and no overshoot at
1/α, then Ct = {γ ∈ Z : sups≤tMγs < 1/α = 0} is P-admissible.
(3) If (Ct) is P-admissible, then we can write Ct =
⋃
P∈P{φ(P) : sups≤tM Ps < 1/α}, where (M Pt ) is a
P-NM with EP[M P0 ] = 1, M
P
∞ ∈ {0, 1/α} and (M Pt ) has no overshoot at level 1/α.
Proof. For the first statement of the theorem, note that Ct = {γ ∈ Z : ψγt = 0} yields a (φ,P , α)-
confidence sequence by Proposition 11. Suppose for contradiction that (C′t) is another (φ,P , α)-confidence
sequence that witnesses the inadmissibility of (Ct). Proposition 9(3) then yields a corresponding family
{(ηγt )}γ∈Z of sequential tests. The inadmissibility of (Ct) then yields some γ ∈ Z such that (ηγt ) strictly
dominates (ψγt ), a contradiction to the assumption that (ψ
γ
t ) is admissible. The second statement follows
in exactly the same way, again by an application of Propositions 11 and 9(3). Assume that (Ct) is
admissible and define ψγt := 1γ/∈Ct for every γ ∈ Z. Note that (ψγt ) is a (Pγ , α)-sequential test by
Proposition 11 and that Ct =
⋃
γ∈Z{γ : ψγt = 0} by definition of ψγt . Now, if (ψγt ) is admissible for
every γ, then we are already done. If it is inadmissible for some γ, we replace it by an admissible test
(ψ˜γt ), which exists by Proposition 7 since Pγ is locally dominated; otherwise define ψ˜γt := ψγt . Defining
C˜t :=
⋃
γ{γ ∈ Z : ψ˜γt = 0}, we see that C˜t is also a (φ,P , α)-confidence sequence by Proposition 9(3),
and certainly C˜t ⊆ Ct. However, if we ever have C˜t ( Ct, then the latter is inadmissible, violating our
initial assumption. Hence C˜t = Ct and ψ˜
γ
t = ψ
γ
t for all γ, t, making (ψ
γ
t ) immediately (Pγ)-admissible,
as required. Statements (1), (2) and (3) are direct corollaries of combining the first part of the theorem
with sufficient and necessary conditions for sequential tests.
The previous two sections argued in detail that restricting our attention to constructions based on
NMs (not NSMs!) does not hurt us: these are in some sense universal constructions. Indeed, if one
is presented with a p-value, e-value, sequential test, or CS constructed in some arbitrary fashion, we
show that one can always uncover a ‘hidden’ underlying NM, such that applying Ville’s inequality or the
optional stopping theorem yields an instrument that is at least as good as the original one.
8 A deeper investigation on admissibility
8.1 The gap between necessary and sufficient conditions (composite)
Recall that we were able to crisply summarize the necessary conditions for admissibility using martingales
in Corollary 23 and sufficient conditions in Corollary 26. The following discussion probes at the gap
between necessary and sufficient conditions for composite admissibility, in order to demonstrate that the
gap is real. We begin with two instructive examples that demonstrate that the necessary conditions of
Theorem 23 are not actually sufficient for admissibility.
Example 28 (Necessary conditions for Theorem 23(2) are not sufficient). Let Q := {Q+, Q−} consist of
two measures: under both Q+ and Q−, the observations Yt are i.i.d. standard normal with mean zero and
unit variance. (The two measures may be different on some ‘nuisance parameter’ or for example on a
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second component of the observation process, but this second component will not appear in the definition
of the e-values below. For simplicity, let us also assume that this nuisance parameter is independent from
(Yt), under both measures.) Following the Gaussian example in Section 5.1, define
M+t := exp
(∑
s≤t
Ys − t
2
)
and M−t := exp
(
−
∑
s≤t
Ys − t
2
)
.
Then (M+t ) is a Q+-NM, and (M
−
t ) is a Q−-NM. Indeed, both processes are martingales under both
measures. The corresponding e-value for Q produced by Proposition 20 is
et = min{M+t ,M−t } = exp
(
−
∣∣∣∑
s≤t
Ys
∣∣∣− t
2
)
.
Then (et) is the minimum of two martingales, both under Q+ and Q−, hence a supermartingale under both
measures. Moreover, the martingale part of (et) is the same under both measures (as both measures agree
on the filtration generated by the process (Yt)) and strictly dominates (et) under both measures. This
proves that (et) is inadmissible since it is strictly dominated by a Q-NM.
Example 29 (Necessary conditions for Theorem 23(1) are not sufficient). Assume that Q is the set of
probability measures under which X1 is Bernoulli and X2 = X3 = . . . = 0. Consider now
p1 := 1X1=0U + 1X1=1
√
U
and p2 = p3 = . . . = p1. Note that p1 ≥ U by construction and hence is valid. Then (pt) is an anytime
valid p-value and satisfies Theorem 23(1) and Proposition 22(1). Here
pQ1 = p
Q
2 = p
Q
3 = . . . = FQ(p1) = (1 − q)p1 + qp21,
where q := Q(X1 = 1) ∈ [0, 1], for each Q ∈ Q and FQ is the Q-distribution function of p1. Indeed, by
definition pQ1 is Q-uniform and considering small q’s it is easy to see that p1 = ess supQ∈Q p
Q
1. However,
(pt) is indeed inadmissible as it is dominated by (U).
Next, we discuss anti-concentration, which are somewhat surprisingly insufficient for admissibility.
8.2 Composite Ville-like anti-concentration bounds
Since Ville’s inequality has been often used in this paper to demonstrate validity, one would hope that if
Ville’s inequality is ‘essentially’ tight (it holds with ‘almost’ equality) then the corresponding inferential in-
struments may be close to admissible. We examine this angle next. Below, we derive an anti-concentration
(lower) bound to complement the upper bound of Ville’s inequality.
Lemma 30 (Anti-concentration for pointwise NMs). Let (Mt) be a Q–NM with M0 = 1, so that the
‘multiplicative increment’ Yt := Mt/Mt−1 (with 0/0 := 1) has unit mean. Assume that the aggregate
empirical variance of (Yt) is Q-almost surely infinite, i.e.,
Q
(∑
t∈N
(Yt − 1)2 =∞
)
= 1. (21)
Then M∞ = 0, Q-almost surely. Assume further that (Yt) satisfies a tail condition for some ε > 0 and all
Ft−1-measurable random variables β > 1
EQ [Yt |Ft−1, Yt ≥ β ] ≤ β(1 + ε). (22)
Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1] we have
α ≥ Q
(
sup
t∈N0
Mt ≥ 1
α
)
≥ α
1 + ε
.
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The proof is in Appendix B. We observe that (22) is satisfied, for example, when Q(Yt ≤ 1+ε) = 1 for
all t ∈ N. We note that (21) is easily satisfied when P is a product measure and thus (Yt) is a sequence of
i.i.d. random variables, as long as Q(Yt 6= 1) > 0. We can now extend the above pointwise result to the
composite setting, and once more this result is of independent interest.
Corollary 31 (Anti-concentration for bounded composite NMs). Consider a family Q of probability
measures and a Q-NM (Mt) with M0 = 1. Define Yt := Mt/Mt−1 (with 0/0 := 1) and assume that for
each ε > 0 there exists some Q ∈ Q such that conditions (21) and (22) hold. Then
sup
Q∈Q
Q
(
sup
t∈N0
Mt ≥ 1
α
)
= α, for any α ∈ (0, 1].
In words, the above result establishes rather simple and interpretable sufficient conditions under which
pt := infs≤t 1/Ms uses up all its type-I error budget, meaning that at least in a worst-case sense, Ville’s
inequality did not lead to a conservative test.
Unfortunately, Example 43 shows that even under the assumptions of the previous corollary, such
(pt) does not need to be admissible. This further demonstrates the subtleties of establishing sufficient
conditions for admissibility. Nevertheless, Corollary 31 is of independent interest, and shows that a fairly
intuitive condition that is frequently satisfied does not suffice for admissibility.
8.3 The role of initial randomization in determining admissibility
The admissibility of p-values is probably the most subtle of the four cases, and randomization appears to
play a key role in enabling admissible constructions. The key difficulty is in dealing with atomic limiting
distributions, and we delve more into this topic here with several subtle examples.
In statement (1)(b) of Theorem 26, 1/ sups∈N0 Ms is assumed to have an atomless distribution function
F∞. Initial randomization turns out to be necessary for this to hold. To formalize this claim, consider a
martingale (Mt) and define Yt :=Mt/Mt−1 with 0/0 := 1. We now argue the following:
If M0 = 1, Q-almost surely, then sup
t∈N0
Mt has an atom at one under Q.
The proof is simple, so we present it immediately. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Q(Y1 6=
1) > 0. Since E[Y1] = 1, there exists some η > 0 such that Q(Y1 ≤ 1− η) > η. On the event {Y1 ≤ 1− η},
the conditional version of Ville’s inequality (10) yields that Q(supt∈NMt ≥ 1|F1) ≤ M1 ≤ 1 − η. Hence
on this event we have Q(supt∈NMt < 1|F1) ≥ η, yielding the unconditional bound Q(supt∈NMt < 1) ≥ η2.
This then gives Q(supt∈N0 Mt = 1) ≥ η2. Hence supt∈N0 Mt has an atom at one, and so does the induced
p-value, completing the proof of the aforementioned fact.
In contrast, if we consider the martingale (M ′t) with randomized initial value M ′t := (1− ε)Mt +2εU ,
where ε ∈ (0, 1/3), and recall that U is the (independent) F0-measurable [0, 1]-uniformly distributed
random variable, then supt∈N0 M
′
t = (1− ε) supt∈N0 Mt + 2εU has a density since it is the convolution of
(1 − ε) supt∈N0 Mt with a random variable that has a density. Sometimes this density can be explicitly
derived; for calculations involving the memoryless exponential law, see Example 41.
We note above that atoms at one are ‘obviously’ undesirable for p-values and render them inadmis-
sible in general, but, quite surprisingly, there do exist admissible anytime p-values with atomic limiting
distributions, where the atom is at 1/2; see Example 42.
To end the discussion about atoms, we remark that atomic limiting distributions occur more often in
discrete time than in continuous time. For example, if (Bt)t∈[0,∞) is a standard Brownian motion, then
(exp(Bt− t/2))t∈[0,∞) is a martingale, and (1/ supt≥0 exp(Bt− t/2)) is exactly [0, 1]-uniformly distributed.
However, the corresponding standard Gaussian NM from (17) has that (1/ supt∈N0 Gt) is atomic.
In sharp contrast, initial randomization causes sequential tests based on e-values to become inadmissi-
ble. Indeed, if the jumps of (et) are continuous with positive probability then the corresponding sequential
test is not admissible for any α ∈ (0, 1) due to overshoot. Only e-values that have atomic jumps can
possibly lead to admissible tests; however, any such e-value cannot lead to an admissible test for every
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α (it will overshoot for some and not for others). We give one example of an admissible sequential test
for (composite) symmetric distributions below, that combines the above (singleton) proposition with the
pointwise-to-composite admissibility Proposition 24.
Example 32. Consider the null H0 : P ∈ S0 from definition (18), and let α = 0.05 so that 1/α = 20.
Consider the process (Mt) defined as follows. Let M0 = 1, and zero is an absorbing state, meaning
that if Mt = 0, then the process stays at zero from then on. If Mt is nonzero, then define Mt+1 =
Mt +
1
2 sign(Xt)1Xt 6=0. It is easy to check that (Mt) is an S0-NM. Define τ as in the proposition above,
as the first time Mt reaches 20. Then, Mτ = 20 on {τ < ∞}, and also M∞ = 0, Qi-almost surely, for
every member of a rich enough reference family {Qi}i∈I ⊂ S0 such that every Q ∈ S0 is locally absolutely
continuous with respect to some Qi (to see this, simply take Qi = Q/2 + G0/2 where G0 is a distribution
that produces a sequence of i.i.d. standard Gaussians; the first part of the mixture yields local domination,
while the second part yields M∞ = 0, Qi-almost surely). Invoking Theorem 26(3) yields that (1Mt≥20) is
Qi-admissible for every such i ∈ I, and so Proposition 24 yields that (1Mt≥20) is (S0, 0.05)-admissible.
More generally, (1Mt≥1/α) is (S0, α)-admissible whenever 1/α ∈ N.
Of course, there is nothing special about 0.05 and 20; for any other α, the process (Mt) can be altered
accordingly to yield an admissible test for that α. The above process (Mt) also delivers admissible tests
for several subsets of S0, for example for if we restricted to only Gaussian distributions with any variance.
In fact, (Mt) is admissible for any subset S˜ of S0 for which each element Q ∈ S˜ is locally dominated by
some measure Q∗ ∈ S˜ such that Q∗(Xt 6= 0 infinitely often) = 0. (Thanks to Lemma 30 we would have
M∞ = 0 as required by Theorem 26(3).) This is rather interesting because admissibility is generally not
subset-proof or superset-proof, but above we have a single process (Mt) that yields admissible e-values
and sequential tests for a variety of subsets of S0.
Continuing from Example 32 and using Proposition 27, we can construct an admissible level α test
for any Sm with m ∈ R, so the above construction yields an admissible CS for the center of symmetry.
9 Example: admissible inference for symmetric distributions
Considering the results of this paper presented thus far, we demonstrate how they may inform practice.
We return to the example from Section 5.2 where we had presented a rather elegant, and intuitive,
exponential NSM for distributions that yield conditionally symmetric observations. However, the results
following the example showed that the tests or confidence sequences stemming from it are inadmissible,
since all admissible constructions must use NMs. We will construct such NMs, which appear to be new
to the best of our knowledge (but we would not be surprised if they have been discovered before).
Recalling the notation from Section 5.2, let S := S0 be the set of laws such that Xt conditional on
Ft−1 is symmetric around zero. We will demonstrate here that inference based on (S0t ) defined in (19) is
inadmissible by explicitly constructing procedures that dominate it.
We note that S is not locally dominated. Indeed, just consider P ∈ S of the form P = µ∞, and note
that there are uncountably many mutually singular choices of for µ; take for instance µ = (δx + δ−x)/2
for x ∈ R. Nevertheless, despite the lack of a reference measure, it is still possible to construct a family
of S-NMs, and thus admissible e-values for S. Indeed, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 33. An adapted process (Mt) with M0 bounded and nonnegative is an S-NM if and only
if Yt := Mt/Mt−1 (with 0/0 := 1) is of the form Yt = ft(Xt), where (ft) is a nonnegative predictable
function such that ft − 1 is odd, or equivalently, ft(x) + ft(−x) = 2 for all x. Moreover, in this case the
corresponding e-value is Q-admissible.
The proof is in Section B. A similar characterization as above also holds for any S-NSM; in the
notation of Proposition 33, (Mt) is an S-NSM if and only if Yt = ft(Xt) where (ft) is a nonnegative
predictable function such that
ft(x) + ft(−x) ≤ 2. (23)
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Moreover, an S-NSM (Mt) can be converted to an S-NM (M˜t) with M˜t =
∏
s≤t f˜s(Xs) by the following
mirroring operation:
f˜t(x) =
{
ft(x), ft(x) ≥ ft(−x);
2− ft(−x), ft(x) < ft(−x).
Indeed, we get that f˜t ≥ ft and that equality holds in (23) with ft replaced by f˜t.
Proposition 33 demonstrates how to construct admissible e-values for symmetry, and we give two
instantiations that we have found (subjectively) elegant. Let h be an odd function and consider
f(x) = 1 + arctanh(x) or f(x) = 1 + cosh(x).
Then, (
∏
s≤t f(Xs))t is an S–NM and thus an e-value for S which is admissible by Proposition 33.
Finally, we return to the exponential S-NSM from [4] from Section 5.2, showing that it is leads to an
inadmissible e-value for S, and improving it to an admissible one by converting the NSM to an NM.
Example 34. Let P ⊃ S and recall from Section 5.2 that the process (St) given by
St =
∏
s≤t
g(Xs), where g(x) = exp
(
x− x
2
2
)
is an S-NSM. Further, (St) is not a martingale unless Xi = 0 for all i, and the corresponding S-safe
e-value is inadmissible due to the following argument. Define
f(x) =
{
g(x), x ≥ 0;
2− g(−x), x < 0.
Then f ≥ g with equality only if x = 0. Further, f(−x) − 1 = 1 − f(x) and finally f is nonnegative
since g ≤ e1/2 ≈ 1.65; hence (∏s≤t f(Xs))t is an S-NM by Proposition 33, which also yields that
the corresponding e-value is admissible. Note that even though the original S-NSM is inadmissible, we
recognize the aesthetic and analytical advantage in having a simple exponential formula.
We end this example with a sobering note: we do not know how to efficiently construct an admissible
p-value for S. We make partial progress from a different angle: that of fully utilizing the available Type-I
error budget. We formalize this in the result below.
Proposition 35. Consider a nonnegative function f , continuous and strictly monotone at zero and such
that f − 1 is odd. Then Mt :=
∏
s≤t f(Xs) is an S-martingale by Proposition 33 and we have
sup
Q∈S
Q
(
sup
t∈N0
Mt ≥ 1
α
)
= α, for any α ∈ (0, 1]. (24)
Thus, defining pt := infs≤t 1/Ms, we have that (pt) is a p-value for S that satisfies
sup
Q∈S,τ≥0
Q (pτ ≤ α) = α, for any α ∈ (0, 1]. (25)
An analogous result to the above proposition is known for the class of subGaussian distributions [11,
Proposition 4], but had only been conjectured for other nonparametric classes like S. Unfortunately, the
p-value for S constructed as (25) above is inadmissible; see Example 43 in Appendix C.
10 Summary
The central contribution of this work is to identify the central role of nonnegative martingales in anytime-
valid sequential inference. As a by-product, we have added several modern mathematical techniques
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to the toolkit of the methodologist who wishes to design statistically efficient methods for inference at
arbitrary stopping times. We end with a few comments.
It is apparent to us that some of our analysis may have been simpler in continuous time. Indeed, some
of the difficulty in constructing admissible sequential tests using e-values arises from the ‘overshoot’, while
the difficulty in designing admissible p-values arises because we do not observe the process ‘in between’
the fixed times and thus the running infimum is not exactly uniformly distributed in the limit. Several of
these problems go away with continuous time/path martingales. However, continuous path martingales
only represent large-scale approximations of most actual experimental setups, which typically involve
discrete events. The accuracy of these approximations would have to be assessed, especially outside very
high-frequency settings like finance, and it may not be clear how to do so. We believe that the additional
effort to understand admissibility in the discrete time setup was fruitful.
Following the literature, our sequential inference tools were only required to have marginal guarantees,
and not conditional ones. To pick one examples, we required that for each Q ∈ Q, an e-value must satisfy
EQ[eτ ] ≤ 1 at arbitrary stopping times τ , but it need not satisfy EQ[et|Fs] ≤ es. This gap between
conditional and marginal guarantees is paramount: it allows for the construction of e-values that are not
simply Q-NMs, because in several settings of interest, one can show that the only nontrivial Q-NM is
the constant process that equals one at all times, but nontrivial e-values with power to detect deviations
from Q can still be constructed. We explore these connections further by using a structural notion called
‘fork-convexity’ in a separate work.
Finally, the paper provides a rather general treatment of the inferential tools and problem settings.
However, perhaps additional insights could be gained when P or Q have special structure, or when we
pay attention to particular classes of stopping times, or restrict ourselves to a bounded horizon; these
may all be promising directions to explore. Finally, while we take step forward in relating the various
concepts used for sequential inference, and present a thorough analysis of their validity and admissibility,
the question of optimality is unaddressed by our work. Of course, this usually needs to be studied by
specifying appropriate alternatives, and introducing metrics by which to judge optimality (such as the
GROW criterion of Grünwald et al. [9]), and so we leave such considerations for future work.
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A Additional technical concepts and definitions
A.1 Reference measures and local absolute continuity
Consider a probability space with a filtration (Ft)t∈N0 . Let R be a particular probability measure on F∞;
we think of R as a reference measure. We now explain the concept of local domination and how it allows
us to unambiguously define conditional expectations.
• P is called locally absolutely continuous with respect to R (or locally dominated by R), if Pt ≪ Rt for
all t ∈ N. We write this P≪loc R. More explicitly, this means that
R(A) = 0 ⇒ P(A) = 0, for any A ∈ Ft and t ∈ N.
Local absolute continuity does not imply that P ≪ R. However, it does imply that Pτ ≪ Rτ for
any finite (but possibly unbounded) stopping time τ . Indeed, if A ∈ Fτ and R(A) = 0, then
A ∩ {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all t, and hence P(A) = limt→∞ P(A ∩ {τ ≤ t}) = 0.
• A set P of probability measures on F∞ is called locally dominated by R if every element of P is
locally dominated by R.
• Any P≪loc R has an associated density process, namely the R-martingale (Zt) given by Zt := dPt/dRt.
Being a nonnegative martingale, once Zt reaches zero it stays there. Thus with the convention
0/0 := 1, ratios Zτ/Zt are well-defined for any t ∈ N and any finite stopping time τ ≥ t. Note that
each Zt is defined up to R-nullsets, and therefore also up to P-nullsets.
• If P ≪loc R has density process (Zt), the following ‘Bayes formula’ holds: for any t ∈ N, any finite
stopping times τ , and any nonnegative Fτ -measurable random variable Y , one has
EP[Y | Ft] = ER
[
Zτ
Zt
Y
∣∣∣∣Ft] , P-almost surely.
The right-hand side is uniquely defined R-almost surely (not just P-almost surely), and therefore
provides a ‘canonical’ version of EP[Y | Ft]. We always use this version. This allows us to view such
conditional expectations under P as being well-defined up to R-nullsets.
One might ask why we work with local domination, rather a ‘global’ condition like P≪ R for all P of
interest. The answer is that such a condition would be far too restrictive, as we now illustrate.
Let (Xt)t∈N be a sequence of random variables. For each η ∈ R, let Pη be the distribution such that the
Xt become i.i.d. normal with mean η and unit variance. By the strong law of large numbers, P
η assigns
probability one to the event Aη := {limt→∞ t−1
∑t
s=1Xs = η}. Moreover, the events Aη are mutually
disjoint: Aη∩Aν = ∅ whenever η 6= ν. Therefore, by definition, the measures Pη are all mutually singular.
Since there is an uncountable number of them, there cannot exist a measure R such that Pη ≪ R for all η.
On the other hand, if Pηt denotes the law of the partial sequence X1, . . . , Xt, then the measures P
η
t ,
η ∈ R, are all mutually absolutely continuous. In particular, we could (for instance) use R = P0 as
reference measure and obtain Pηt ≪loc Rt for all η ∈ R.
A.2 Essential supremum and infimum
We briefly review the notions of essential supremum and infimum. For more information, as well as proofs
of the results below, we refer to Section A.5 in [8].
On some probability space, consider a collection (Yα)α∈A of random variables, where A is an arbitrary
index set. IfA is uncountable, the pointwise supremum supα∈A Yα might not be measurable (not a random
variable). Alternatively, it might happen that Yα = 0 almost surely for every α ∈ A, but supα∈A Yα = 1.
For this reason, the pointwise supremum is often not useful. Instead, one can use the essential supremum.
Proposition 36. There exists a [−∞,∞]-valued random variable Y , called the essential supremum and
denoted by ess supα∈A Yα, such that
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1. Y ≥ Yα, almost surely, for every α ∈ A,
2. if Y ′ is a random variable that satisfies Y ′ ≥ Yα, almost surely, for every α ∈ A, then Y ′ ≥ Y ,
almost surely.
The essential supremum is almost surely unique.
In words, the essential supremum is the smallest almost sure upper bound on (Yα). The proposition
guarantees that it always exists. In some cases, more can be said: the essential supremum can be obtained
as the limit of an increasing sequence.
Proposition 37. Suppose (Yα) is closed under maxima, meaning that for any α, β ∈ A there is some
γ ∈ A such that Yγ = max{Yα, Yβ}. Then there is a sequence (αn) such that (Yαn) is an increasing
sequence and ess supα∈A Yα = limn Yαn almost surely.
One can also define the essential infimum by setting
ess inf
α∈A
Yα := − ess sup
α∈A
(−Yα).
This is the largest almost sure lower bound on (Yα). It satisfies properties analogous to those in the
propositions above.
A.3 On the choice of filtration
In most of the paper, we assume that the filtration (Ft) in use is by default the canonical filtration
Ft = σ(U,X1, . . . , Xt). However, there are examples of hypothesis tests for H0 : P ∈ Q where the only
Q-NMs with respect to (Ft) are almost surely constants. For the purpose of designing more powerful
tests, it may make sense to coarsen the filtration.
As a first example, consider the problem of testing if a sequence is exchangeable:
H0 : X1, X2, . . . form an exchangeable sequence.
Vovk [23] demonstrates that all martingales with respect to (Ft) (under the null) are constants, and are
hence all derived tests are powerless to reject the null. Nevertheless, Vovk demonstrates that one can
derive interesting and nontrivial ‘conformal’ martingales (Mt) with respect to the restricted filtration
Gt := σ(M1, . . . ,Mt) ⊂ Ft, that do indeed have power to reject the null (for appropriate deviations from
the null). In short, coarsening the filtration is a design tool that could aid in the construction of more
powerful sequential tests, and anytime-valid p-values and e-values.
In the following example, we show how our choice of including external randomization U into F0 also
helps design better p-values.
Example 38. Assume that Q = {Q}, where under Q we have that X1 is Bernoulli(1/2) and X2, X3, . . . =
0. Consider the canonical filtration, so that F∞ = σ(X1). Then (Mt) with M0 = 1, M1 = 2X1, and
Mt = M1 for t ≥ 2 is a Q-NM and the corresponding p-value (infs≤t 1/Ms) is admissible. (Indeed, any
p-value (pt) has to satisfy Q(p1 ≤ α) ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} for each α ∈ [0, 1]). However, by expanding the filtration
using external randomization, one can easily derive a strictly smaller p-value (pt) by choosing p0 = 1,
p1 ∼ Uniform[0, 1] and pt = p1 for all t > 1. In other words, the original p-value is only admissible under
the filtration generated solely by the observations, but is inadmissible under an expanded filtration that
includes a randomization device (which is the canonical filtration in this paper).
The main idea of the following randomization device is somewhat folklore, but we find the following
succinct lemma useful.
Lemma 39 (Randomization device). If Y is a random variable with distribution function F and U is
an independent uniformly distributed random variable, then
Y ′ := UF (Y ) + (1− U)F (Y−)
is uniformly distributed and satisfies Y ′ ≤ F (Y ).
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Proof. Fix a ∈ [0, 1] and define y := inf{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ a}. Note that
Pr(Y ′ ≤ a|Y ) = Pr
(
U ≤ a− F (y−)
F (y)− F (y−)
∣∣∣∣Y)1Y=y
+ Pr(UF (Y ) + (1− U)F (Y−) ≤ a | Y )1Y 6=y.
(If Pr(Y = y) = 0, the first term should be understood as zero.) On {Y > y} we have a < F (Y−), so
that the second term equals zero. On {Y < y} we have F (Y ) ≤ a, so that the second term instead equals
one. Since also U is uniform and independent of Y , we get
Pr(Y ′ ≤ a|Y ) = a− F (y−)
F (y)− F (y−)1Y=y + 1Y <y.
Taking expectations and simplifying gives Pr(Y ′ ≤ a) = a, showing that Y ′ is uniformly distributed.
Finally, it is clear from the definition of Y ′ that Y ′ ≤ F (Y ).
B Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. It is clear that (ii) =⇒ (iii). The implication (i) =⇒ (ii) follows from
AT =
(⋃
t∈N
(At ∩ {T = t})
)
∪ (A∞ ∩ {T =∞}) ⊆
⋃
t∈N
At.
For (iii) =⇒ (i), take τ := inf{t ∈ N : At occurs}, so that Aτ =
⋃
t∈NAt.
Proof of Lemma 3. First, (i) implies (ii) since NT ≤ supt∈N0 Nt, hence E[NT ] ≤ E[supt∈N0 Nt], for all
random times T . Conversely, for any ε > 0 there exists some random time T such thatNT ≥ supt∈N0 Nt−ε.
Thus if (ii) holds, then E[supt∈N0 Nt] ≤ E[NT ] + ε ≤ 1 + ε. Since ε > 0 was arbitrary, we find that (ii)
implies (i). It is clear that (ii) implies (iii).
The fact that (iii) implies (iv) is however not obvious, and is essentially a consequence of a result
by Shafer et al. [21, Theorem 3], as also noted recently by Kirichenko and Grünwald [14, Lemma 5.1].
First, we note that if (Nt) satisfies (iii), then it is upper-bounded by a nonnegative supermartingale with
initial expected value one, which is precisely its Snell envelope as used in Subsection 6.2. The Doob
decomposition of this Snell envelope gives a nonnegative martingale (Mt) with initial expected value
one that satisfies Nt ≤ Mt for all t ∈ N0. Thus the ‘p-value’ p˜t := infs≤t 1/Ms is anytime-valid and
always lower than pt := infs≤t 1/Ns. In particular, p˜∞ is valid. Recall from Proposition 12 that for any
decreasing g such that
∫ 1
0
g(u)du = 1, we have that e˜t = g(p˜t) is a valid e-value, and in particular f(p˜∞)
is valid, meaning that E[g(p˜∞)] ≤ 1. Since g is decreasing, we can infer that E[g(p˜∞)] = E[g(inft 1/N˜t)] =
E[supt g(1/N˜t)]. Now for y ∈ [1,∞), associate u := 1/y ∈ (0, 1], and define f(y) := g(1/y), so that f is
increasing and a change-of-variables implies that
∫∞
1
f(y)y−2dy = 1. This yields that E[supt f(N˜t)] ≤ 1,
and thus also that E[supt f(Nt)] ≤ 1. Choosing f(y) = √y/2 yields the last claim in (iv).
Proof of Proposition 4. For each t ∈ N0, define a probability measure P′t on the Borel sets of Rt by
P′t(A) := EQ[Mt1A]. Because (Mt) is a martingale under Q, the family {P′t : t ∈ N} forms a consistent
system of finite-dimensional distributions. Therefore, by Kolmogorov’s extension theorem, there exists a
single probability measure P on the Borel sets of Ω = RN whose projection onto Rt is exactly P′t for each
t ∈ N. Put differently, P satisfies Pt = P′t for all t ∈ N, as desired.
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Proof of Proposition 7. We prove the statement for p-values; the same argument holds for e-values and
sequential tests. The proof is based on transfinite induction. Fix some p-value (pt). For all countable
ordinals β, we now recursively define p-values (pβt ) as follows. For β = 1, we set (p
β
t ) := (pt). For any
successor ordinal γ := β + 1, if (pβt ) is Q-admissible we set pγt := pβt , and otherwise we let (pγt ) be any p-
value that strictly dominates (pβt ). For any limit ordinal γ := limn→∞ βn, we define (p
γ
t ) := (limn→∞ p
βn
t ).
Let us now use the induction assumption that (pβt ) is Q-valid for all β < γ, for this limit ordinal γ. Since
(limn→∞ p
βn
t ) is a decreasing limit, we have for every ε > 0, α ∈ [0, 1], and Q ∈ Q that
Q
(
inf
t∈N0
p
γ
t ≤ α
)
≤ Q
(
inf
t∈N0
p
β
t < α+ ε
)
= lim
n→∞ Q
(
inf
t∈N0
p
βn
t < α+ ε
)
≤ α+ ε.
It follows that (pγt ) is Q-valid. By transfinite induction, this holds for all countable ordinals β.
Writing R for the reference probability measure, {ER[
∑
t∈N0 2
−tpβt ]}β defines a decreasing [0, 2]-valued
transfinite sequence. This sequence must eventually become stationary, that is, it becomes constant for
all β beyond some countable ordinal β0. Thus p
β
t = p
β0
t for all β ≥ β0 and all t ∈ N0. By construction,
(pβ0t ) must then be admissible and dominate (pt). This shows that any p-value for Q can be dominated
by a Q-admissible p-value.
Let us also remark that the statement for e-values and sequential tests could be proved in a more
constructive manner as in Subsections 6.2 and 6.3.
Proof of Proposition 13. To see (1), fix a probability measure Q ∈ conv(Q). Then there exist Q1, Q2 ∈ Q
and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that Q = λQ1 + (1 − λ)Q2. Let now (et) denote an e-value for Q. Consider some
stopping time τ and note that
EQ[eτ ] = λEQ1 [eτ ] + (1 − λ)EQ2 [eτ ] ≤ λ+ 1− λ = 1,
since (et) is Q-safe. This yields that (et) is also conv(Q)-safe. The same argument also applies for valid
p-values and sequential tests.
Next, (2) follows in a similar way. Assume that (et) is Q-admissible and consider some conv(Q)-valid
e-value (e′t) that satisfies Q(e′t ≥ et) = 1 for all t ∈ N and Q ∈ conv(Q) and there exists some Q∗ ∈ conv(Q)
and some t ∈ N such that Q∗(e′t > et) > 0. Since we always have Q∗ = λQ1+(1−λ)Q2 for some Q1, Q2 ∈ Q
and λ ∈ [0, 1] we also have Q1(e′t > et) > 0 or Q2(e′t > et) > 0, leading to a contradiction. Again, the same
argument also applies for admissibile p-values and sequential tests.
Proof of Proposition 9. We prove the three statements in order. Denote the true data-generating measure
as Q∗ ∈ Q. Let (ψt) denote the constructed binary sequence, which we will now show is a (Q, α)-sequential
tets. Let τ denote an arbitrary stopping time, potentially infinite.
(1) Q∗(ψτ = 1) = Q∗(pτ ≤ α) ≤ α since (pt) is Q∗-valid.
(2) Q∗(ψτ = 1) = Q∗(eτ ≥ 1/α) ≤ αEQ∗ [eτ ] ≤ α, where we used Markov’s inequality and the fact that
(et) is Q
∗-safe. In short, e-values satisfy Ville’s inequality.
(3) Q∗(ψτ = 1) = Q∗(φ(Q) ∩ Cτ = ∅) ≤ Q∗(φ(Q∗) /∈ Cτ ) ≤ α, where the first inequality follows because
the event {φ(Q) ∩ Cτ = ∅} implies that Cτ does not contain φ(Q∗), which is improbable under Q∗.
The fact that the (Q, α)-sequential tests in (1) and (2) are nested is obvious. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10. We prove the three statements in order. Denote the true data-generating mea-
sure by Q∗ ∈ Q. Let (pt) denote the constructed sequence of random variables, which we will now show
in each case is a p-value. Let τ denote an arbitrary stopping time, potentially infinite.
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(1) Q∗(pτ ≤ α) = Q∗(eτ ≥ 1/α) ≤ EQ∗ [eτ ] · α ≤ α, where we used Markov’s inequality and the fact that
(et) is Q
∗-safe.
(2) Q∗(pτ > α) = Q∗(ψτ (α) = 0) ≥ 1−α, where the equality follows since the sequential tests are nested
and the inequality because (ψt(α)) is a (Q, α)-sequential test.
(3) Q∗(pτ > α) = Q∗(φ(Q) ∩ Cτ (α) = ∅) ≥ Q∗(φ(Q∗) /∈ Cτ (α)) ≥ 1− α as in (2).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11. Denote the true data-generating measure by P which must lie in Pγ for some
γ ∈ Z. Let (Ct) denote the constructed sequence of sets, which we will now show is a (φ,P , α)-confidence
sequence. To this end, let τ denote an arbitrary stopping time, potentially infinite. Then, we have
P(φ(P) /∈ Cτ ) = P(γ /∈ Cτ ) ≤ P(ψγτ = 1) ≤ α since (ψγt ) is a (Pγ , α)-sequential test. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 12. Define et := f(pt); we must show that (et) is Q-safe. If (pt) is Q-valid then for
any stopping time τ and Q ∈ Q, the distribution of pτ is stochastically larger than a uniform random
variable (denoted V ). Thus for any calibrator f , we have EQ[eτ ] = EQ[f(pτ )] ≤ E[f(V )] =
∫ 1
0 f(v)dv = 1.
Since this result holds for any τ and Q ∈ Q, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 22. Let (pt) denote a Q-admissible p-value. For each Q ∈ Q, let (pQt ) be a Q-
admissible p-value that dominates (pt). Such (p
Q
t ) exists thanks to Proposition 7. Let us now define
p′t := ess supQ∈Q p˜
Q
t , which is Q-valid thanks to Proposition 20(1). Clearly, we have p′t ≥ pt for all t ∈ N0.
Since (pt) is Q-admissible, we indeed have p′t = pt for all t ∈ N0, yielding the assertion for p-values. The
assertions for e-values and sequential tests are shown in the same manner.
Proof of Lemma 30. Let τ denote the first time t that Mt ≥ 1/α and let us write
q := Q(τ <∞) = Q
(
sup
t∈N0
Mt >
1
α
)
.
Next, (21) yields Q(M∞ = 0) = 1, for example, by [17, Theorem 4.2]. Note that the stopped process
M τ is a bounded martingale, hence uniformly integrable, yielding EQ[M
τ∞] = 1. On the event {τ = ∞},
we have M τ∞ = 0. These observations then yield
1 = EQ [M
τ
∞] =
∑
t∈N
EQ [Mt1τ=t] =
∑
t∈N
EQ [Mt−1Yt1τ=t] =
∑
t∈N
EQ
[
EQ
[
Yt
∣∣∣∣Ft−1, Yt ≥ 1αMt−1
]
Mt−11τ=t
]
≤ 1
α
(1 + ε)
∑
t∈N
EQ [1τ=t] = q
1 + ε
α
.
This then gives q ≥ α/(1 + ε), yielding the claim.
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Proof of Proposition 33. First, assume (Mt) is an S-NM and fix a time t. Since (Yt) is adapted, Yt is
a function of X1, . . . , Xt. Hence we may write Yt = ft(Xt) for some nonnegative predictable function
ft(·). More explicitly, Yt = ft(X1, . . . , Xt−1;Xt). Now pick any real numbers x1, . . . , xt. Consider the
two-point measures µi := (δ−xi + δxi)/2 for i ≤ t and µi := µt for i > t, and let P :=
∏
∈N µi be the
distribution that makes the data independent with Xi ∼ µi. Then P ∈ S. Moreover,
1 = EPx [Yt|Ft−1] =
1
2
(ft(X1, . . . , Xt−1;xt) + ft(X1, . . . , Xt−1;−xt)) .
Since the event {Xi = xi, i = 1, . . . , t− 1} has positive probability, we get
1
2
(ft(x1, . . . , xt−1;xt) + ft(x1, . . . , xt−1;−xt)) = 1.
But the numbers x1, . . . , xt were arbitrary, so it follows that the function x 7→ ft(x1, . . . , xt−1;x) is odd
for all x1, . . . , xt−1.
For the reverse direction fix some P ∈ S and some t. Then
EP[Yt|Ft−1] = EP[ft(Xt)|Ft−1]
(i)
=
1
2
(EP[ft(Xt)|Ft−1] + EP[ft(−Xt)|Ft−1])
= 1 +
1
2
(EP[ft(Xt)− 1|Ft−1] + EP[ft(−Xt)− 1|Ft−1])
(ii)
= 1,
yielding the statement. Above, equality (i) follows by symmetry of P, and equality (ii) follows because
ft − 1 is odd.
Now let M denote any S-NM and let P be any distribution. Define another distribution Ps by setting
P
s(Xt ≤ x|Ft−1) := 1
2
(P(Xt ≤ x|Ft−1) + P(−Xt ≤ x|Ft−1))
for all t ∈ N. Think of this as the ‘adaptive symmetrization’ of P. Then Ps ∈ S and P is locally dominated
by Ps. The admissibility of the corresponding e-value then follows from Proposition 24(2). This concludes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 35. This follows from an application of Corollary 31. Fix some ε > 0. Since f is
continuous at zero and f(0) = 1 there exists some η > 0 such that f(x) ≤ 1 + ε for all x ∈ (−2η, 2η).
This implies (22). Moreover, since f is strictly monotone at zero we may assume that f(η) 6= 1.
Consider now the measure µη := (δ−η + δη)/2 and note that Qη := µ∞η ∈ S. Hence Qη(f(Xt) ≤
1 + ε) = 1 for all t ∈ N. Moreover,
Qη
(∑
t∈N
(f(Xt)− 1)2 =∞
)
= Qη
(∑
t∈N
(f(η)− 1)2 =∞
)
= 1,
since f − 1 is odd and f(η) 6= 1. This shows that (21) holds. Hence Corollary 31 can indeed be applied
and the statement follows.
C Auxiliary examples
The following example shows that Proposition 13 cannot be extended to confidence sequences.
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Example 40 (Confidence sequences do not mesh with convex closures). Let µ+ (µ−) denote the law of a
normal random variable with unit variance and mean 1 (−1). Moreover, let P = {µ∞+ , µ∞− } be the family
of i.i.d. laws of such distributions. Consider φmean, which satisfies φmean(µ∞− ) = −1 and φmean(µ∞+ ) = 1.
Then (Ct) given by Ct = {−1,+1} is a (trivial) (φmean,P , α)-valid CS for α ∈ [0, 1].
Now consider the measure P = (µ∞+ + µ
∞
− )/2 ∈ conv(P), which satisfies φmean(P) = 0. Since X¯t
converges to either −1 or 1, P-almost surely, it is clear that (Ct) is not a (φmean, conv(P), α)-valid CS for
any α ∈ [0, 1].
Example 41 (Differences in the admissibility of e-values and p-values). Consider Q under which (Xt) are
i.i.d. with standard exponential law. Let (Mt) be defined by Mt :=
∏
s≤tXs. Then (Mt) is clearly a Q-NM.
We can now compute the distribution of supt∈N0 Mt. Indeed, fix some α ∈ (0, 1) and define the stopping
time τ := inf{t ∈ N :Mt > 1/α} and the probability of stopping as q := Q(supt∈N0 Mt > 1/α) = Q(τ <∞).
Thanks to the memoryless property of the exponential distribution we then have
1 = EQ[Mτ ] = q
(
1
α
+ 1
)
;
hence q = α/(α+ 1). (We have also used that Mτ = 0 Q-almost surely if τ =∞.)
Thus if F Q denotes the distribution function of inft∈N0 1/Mt we get that F Q(1) = 1 and
F Q(α) =
α
α+ 1
, α ∈ [0, 1).
In particular, we have Q(inft∈N0 1/Mt = 1) = 1/2. This can be independently verified by noting
Q
(
sup
t∈N0
Mt = 1
)
= EQ
[
1Y1<1Q
(
sup
t∈N0
Mt = 1
∣∣∣∣Y1)] = EQ [1Y1<1(1− Y12
)]
=
1
2
.
This again demonstrates that without randomization, the p-value inft∈N0 1/Mt has an atom at one and is
thus inadmissible, also making the entire sequence (infs≤t 1/Ms) inadmissible. In contrast, if Q is the set
of all measures such that (Xt) are independent, positive and their expectation equals one, then (Mt) is a
Q-NM and hence is an admissible e-value for Q by Corollary 26. A similar statement holds if instead the
condition on Xt is relaxed to having expectation at most one, as long as we further insist that Xt has a
density, by instead invoking Proposition 24.
The aforementioned issue with p-values having an atomic limiting distribution disappears with initial
randomization. Fix now ε ∈ (0, 1/3) and let U denote a (0, 1)-uniformly distributed random variable
(under Q), independent of inft∈N0 1/Mt under Q. Define now (M ′t) by M
′
t := (1 − ε)Mt + 2εU and let
F Q
′
denote the distribution function of inft∈N0 1/M ′t, which takes values in (0, 1/(1− 3ε). Then for any
β ∈
(
0, 11−3ε
)
, we have
F Q
′
(β) = EQ
[
Q
(
inf
t∈N0
1
Mt
≤ (1− ε)β
1− 2εUβ
∣∣∣∣U)] = EQ [1U≥1/(2εβ)−1+ε + 1U≤1/(2εβ)−1+ε (1− ε)β(1 − ε)β + 1− 2εUβ
]
= 1−
((
1
2εβ
− 1 + ε
)
∧ 1
)
− 1− ε
2ε
(
log
((
1− 3ε+ 1
β
)
∨ (1 + ε− 2ε2))− log(1− ε+ 1
β
))
.
Since we can precisely calculate the nonatomic limiting distribution function, an admissible p-value can
be explicitly constructed.
Example 42 (Atomic admissible p-values exist even in the presence of an independent F0-measurable
random device). Assume Q := {Q}, where (Xt) are independent and uniformly distributed under Q. Then
it is easy to construct an adapted process (pt) with the following properties:
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• pt is supported on {1/2 + k/2t+1}k=1,...2t ;
• Q(pt = 1/2 + 1/2t+1) = 1/2 + 1/2t+1 and Q(pt = 1/2 + k/2t+1) = 1/2t+1 for all k = 2, . . . 2t;
• (pt) is a Q-MM with
Q
(
pt+1 − 1
2
∈
{
2k − 1
2t+2
,
k
2t+1
}∣∣∣∣ pt − 12 = k2t+1
)
= 1
for all k = 1, . . . 2t and t ∈ N;
• (pt) is independent of U .
Note that p∞ := inft∈N pt satisfies Q(p∞ ≤ α) = α1α≥1/2 ≤ α for all α ∈ [0, 1]; in particular (pt) is an
anytime p-value and its limit p∞ has an atom at 1/2.
We also claim that (pt) is Q-admissible. Indeed, assume there exists an anytime p-value (p′t) that
dominates (pt) (we explicitly allow (p′t) to depend on the randomization device U). Then there exists
some t ∈ N such that Q(p′t < pt) > 0. Let us first assume that Q(p′t < 1/2 + 1/2t+1) > 0. In combination
with the fact that (pt) is a Q-MM there exists some n > t+ 2 such that
Q
({
p′t ≤
1
2
+
1
2n+1
}
∩
{
p∞ ≥ 1
2
+
1
2t+2
})
> 0.
Since p′∞ ≤ p∞ and since Q(p∞ ≥ 1/2+1/2t+2) = 1/2−1/2t+2, we hence obtain Q(p′∞ ≥ 1/2+1/2t+2) <
1/2−1/2t+2, a contradiction to the fact that (p′t) is an anytime p-value. We obtain similar contradictions
if we assume Q({p′t < pt} ∩ {pt = 1/2 + k/2t+1}) > 0 for some k = 2, . . . , 2t. This shows that (pt) is
indeed Q-admissible, despite having an atom and being independent of the randomization device.
Example 43 (A p-value for S that satisfies Proposition 35 need not be admissible). Fix the func-
tion f : x 7→ ((1 + x) ∧ 2)+. This function satisfies the criteria of Proposition 35. Hence the pro-
cess Mt :=
∏
s≤t f(Xs) is an S-martingale and we also have (24). Consider the p-value (pt) given by
pt = infs≤t 1/Ms. This is a p-value by (24).
Define next p′t = pt for t = 0, 1 and p′t = pt−1/4 1X1∨X2≤−1 for t ≥ 2. Clearly we have Q(p′t ≤ pt) = 1
for all t ∈ N0 and Q ∈ S and there exists Q∗ ∈ S such that Q∗(p′2 < p2) > 0. We now claim that (p′t) is
also S-valid. We will prove this claim below. This assertion then yields that (24) is not sufficient for the
admissibility of the corresponding p-value in general.
We now prove the claim that (p′t) is S-valid. To do so we consider a subset S˜ ⊂ S, namely those
measures Q ∈ S that satisfy Q(X1 ≤ −1) ∈ {0, 1/2}. Note that S = conv(S˜), the convex hull of S˜. Thanks
to Proposition 13(1) it suffices to argue that (p′t) is S˜-valid. To this end, note that on the event {X1 > −1}
we have pt = p′t for all t ∈ N0. On the other hand, on the event {X1 ≤ −1} we have pt = 1 for all t ∈ N0.
Fix now some α ∈ (0, 1) and Q ∈ S˜. Without loss of generality we can assume that Q(X1 ≤ −1) = 1/2,
otherwise there is nothing to be argued. We now need to show that
Q(p′∞ ≤ α) ≤ α. (26)
To make headway, note that
{p′∞ ≤ α} = ({p′∞ ≤ α} ∩ {X1 > −1}) ∪ ({p′∞ ≤ α} ∩ {X1 ≤ −1})
⊂ {p∞ ≤ α} ∪
{
p∞ − 1
4
1X1∨X2≤−1 ≤ α
}
= {p∞ ≤ α} ∪
{
1
4
1X1∨X2≤−1 ≥ 1− α
}
.
Thus, if α < 3/4 then {p′∞ ≤ α} ⊂ {p∞ ≤ α} and we have (26). Let us now assume that α ≥ 3/4. Note
that since Q(p∞ = 1) ≥ Q(X1 ≤ −1) = 1/2 and hence Q(p∞ ≤ α) < 1/2. This then yields
Q(p′∞ ≤ α) ≤ Q(p∞ ≤ α) + Q(X1 ∨X2 ≤ −1) < 1/2 + 1/22 = 3/4 ≤ α,
yielding the S˜-validity of (p′t), hence also the S-validity of (p
′
t).
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